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Green and Kent: May Class Counsel Also Represent Lead Plaintiffs

MAY CLASS COUNSEL ALSO REPRESENT LEAD
PLAINTIFFS?
Bruce A. Green & Andrew Kent*
Abstract
For decades, courts and commentators have been aware that the
potential for conflicting interests among the class representatives, class
counsel, and absent class members is inherent in the class action device.
Notwithstanding this realization and a substantial amount of scholarly
and judicial commentary on class conflicts, one kind of conflict has not
received due attention: the conflict that inevitably arises when class
counsel also represents class members as individuals. This conflict—so
common to be almost invisible—arises from the beginning of a putative
class representation and may create a fraught situation for a lawyer
concurrently representing both the class (or putative class) and the class
representative individually. This Article examines three situations in
which these conflicts are most acute: holdouts (where the class
representative holds out against a settlement that would benefit the class
as a whole), sellouts (where the class representative could benefit
personally by settling individual claims only), and payouts (where the
class representative could use class action procedures to benefit
personally at the expense of the class). Additionally, this Article canvases
potential solutions and concludes that radical ones—for instance, banning
concurrent representation of a class and a class member individually—
would do more harm than good. Therefore, this Article recommends more
measured responses, primarily (1) greater disclosure of risks to individual
clients by their attorneys; (2) greater judicial oversight; and (3) an
amendment to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or its
advisory committee notes, calling on courts to police the types of conflict
this Article identifies.
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INTRODUCTION
An attorney seeking to represent a class ordinarily begins by
representing one or more plaintiffs individually.1 The clients may be
institutional investors who have potential securities law claims, or
individuals with potential consumer law, employment, or civil rights
1. See, e.g., 6 WILLIAM RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 19:2 (5th ed.
2011) (“[A]n attorney seeking to represent, or representing, a class will almost certainly have an
attorney–client relationship with the class representatives. . . . If the class is certified, the
individual client likely becomes the class representative and remains a client for all purposes . . . .”
(emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted)). Similarly, formation of an individual attorney–client
relationship is common when preparing to seek appointment as a lead plaintiff-class counsel
tandem in a class action already filed by someone else, as occurs frequently in putative securities
class actions, where the relevant statute makes clear that a class member who has not filed a
complaint may be appointed to be the lead plaintiff. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i) (2018).
For examples of retainer agreements that provide for an individual representation first,
followed by an attempt to obtain class certification and add the class as a client, see Retainer
Agreement for Legal Services, Lopez v. Delta Airlines Inc., No. 2:16-cv-04497, 2017 WL
6520612 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2017), aff’d, 720 F. App'x 400 (9th Cir. 2018), ECF No. 57-1;
Retainer Agreement – Class Action, BABB Real Estate LLC v. Bennett Shelaine, No. 3:10-cv00119, 2011 WL 13209315 (W.D. Wisc. July 29, 2011), ECF No. 84-2; Retainer Agreement,
http://www.hallandalebeachfl.gov/files/2012-05-02/Item%209C/SUPP_DOCS/Documents/Doc
2.rtf [https://perma.cc/55S4-CRNK]; Standard Retainer Agreement, SCHOENGOLD & SPORN, P.C.,
https://www.spornlaw.com/docs/retainer.pdf [https://perma.cc/LXZ9-PV54].
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claims, among others.2 The practice raises important questions about
conflicts of interest. However, courts, class action lawyers, and
commentators have not sufficiently appreciated the problem.
Before filing a class action, the lawyer owes ethical and fiduciary
duties—for instance, loyalty, competence, and confidentiality—
exclusively to the clients individually.3 Even after the lawyer files a class
action complaint on behalf of the client, or files a motion for appointment
of lead plaintiff and lead counsel in an already-filed action, the lawyer
presumably must represent the client individually, at least until the court
certifies the class; until then, the named plaintiff, not the class—which
does not yet exist—is the party to the lawsuit.4 The individual client may
initially seek counsel’s disinterested legal advice about whether to bring
an individual claim or a class action and whether to apply to serve as a
lead plaintiff in a class action; the individual client may later seek advice
about whether to seek a settlement and other issues.
Caselaw, the professional literature, and publicly available retainer
agreements5 indicate that as a class action lawsuit progresses, lawyers for
the class customarily continue their individual representations. 6 There is
no evidence that the lawyers, perceiving that they have a conflict of
interest, commonly seek the informed consent of their individual clients

2. Professor Brian Fitzpatrick’s study of all federal court class actions settled in a two-year
period (2006 and 2007) found that the most common kinds of class actions were securities cases
(37%), labor and employment (14%), consumer (13%), employee benefits (9%), civil rights (9%),
debt collection (6%), antitrust (4%), and commercial (2%). See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical
Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 811, 818
(2010).
3. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (describing
lawyers’ obligations to their clients from an ethical and fiduciary perspective).
4. See RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, § 19:2.
5. Although we have not conducted a systematic study, we have reviewed several dozen
retainer agreements that are publicly available on PACER, the websites of class action law firms,
and websites devoted to settlements in particular class actions. The scope of the review was
limited to class action litigation in federal courts and targeted agreements from a variety of kinds
of class actions. We found no agreements that discussed ending the individual client relationship
after class certification. Many of the agreements that were reviewed are cited throughout this
Article.
6. An individual representation alongside a class representation is more likely to occur
where the litigation could have a more-than-nominal value to an individual plaintiff. See Nancy
J. Moore, “Who Should Regulate Class Action Lawyers?,” 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1477, 1497–98;
cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in
Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 388 (2000) (discussing a mass tort action
with both individual and class representation by the same lawyers).
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or the approval of the court to the joint representation of both the class
and lead plaintiffs as individual claimants.7
In federal court class actions, district court judges principally address
a lawyer’s conflicts of interest at two stages. First, in deciding which
lawyer to appoint as class counsel and whether that lawyer can “fairly
and adequately represent the interests of the class,”8 courts may consider
whether the loyalty and competence of the lawyer would be compromised
by the lawyer’s duties to other current or former clients or by the lawyer’s
own competing interests.9 Second, in determining the fairness of
proposed settlements,10 which are far more common than trials,11 judges
may consider whether class counsel’s negotiations or decisions were
compromised by a conflict of interest.12 (Sometimes courts address
conflicts at other procedural stages, for instance, in determining the
amount of attorneys’ fees to be awarded.)13 There is substantial literature

7. We have seen the occasional retainer agreement that hints at the issue. See, e.g.,
Authority to Represent and Retainer Agreement for Class Action Lawsuit, In re Ocean Fin. Corp.
Prescreening Litig., No. 1:06-CV-3515 (N.D. Ill. filed Feb. 16, 2007), ECF No. 84-2 (“I
understand that if My Attorneys are approved as class counsel, they may owe duties and
responsibilities to all members of the class, rather than to me alone. I hereby consent to My
Attorneys acting as class counsel if the court so designates them.”).
8. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(4). Before subsection (g) was added in 2003 specifically
addressing the appointment of class counsel, “courts . . . scrutinized proposed class
counsel . . . under Rule 23(a)(4),” Id. at 23 advisory committee’s note to 2003 amendment, which
requires that “the representative parties” be able and likely to “fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class,” Id. at 23(a)(4); see also Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,
626 n.20 (1997) (stating that the adequacy of representation inquiry involves looking at the
“competency and conflicts of class counsel”).
9. See, e.g., Wininger v. SI Mgmt. L.P., 301 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he
question of whether there is an ethical conflict forms part of the class certification question.”).
10. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) (“If the proposal [for settlement] would bind class members,
the court may approve it only after a hearing and only on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and
adequate after considering whether: (A) the class representatives and class counsel have
adequately represented the class; [and] (B) the proposal was negotiated at arm’s length . . . .”).
11. Fitzpatrick, supra note 2, at 812 (“[V]irtually all cases certified as class actions and not
dismissed before trial end in settlement.”).
12. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 856–57, 865 (1999) (reversing
approval of a class action settlement because, among other reasons, class counsel represented
groups with conflicting interests); Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 785 (7th Cir.
2004) (“Because class actions are rife with potential conflicts of interest between class counsel
and class members, district judges presiding over such actions are expected to give careful
scrutiny to the terms of proposed settlements in order to make sure that class counsel are behaving
as honest fiduciaries for the class as a whole.” (citations omitted)).
13. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Judicial Review of Class Action
Settlements, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 167, 198 (2009) (describing the conflict of interest that the
attorney’s fee presents).
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on conflicts of interest in class actions.14 But courts, class action lawyers,
and commentators have not deeply analyzed, and rarely even
acknowledge, a conflict of interest that is ubiquitous in class actions—
namely, the conflict of interest that inheres when counsel for a class
concurrently represents class representatives as individual clients.15
Lawyers may assume that they can continue to represent class
representatives throughout the lawsuit because the interests of the class
representatives are largely aligned with those of the class. To certify a
class, the court will have to determine that these proposed class
representatives are “members” of the class, have claims “typical” of the

14. For discussions of intra-class conflicts, that is, the differing interests of different
members of the class, see Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client
Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 471–72 (1976) (explaining
adverse interests of clients and lawyers during school desegregation litigation); Samuel
Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805, 825 (1997) (discussing the
conflict of plaintiff lawyers’ interests and the interest of absent class members); Geoffrey P.
Miller, Conflicts of Interest in Class Action Litigation: An Inquiry into the Appropriate Standard,
2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 581, 581 (discussing conflicts between differently situated members of
classes, as well as conflicts between clients and their attorneys within class action litigation);
Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1183 (1982)
(discussing the difficulties in defining case objectives in class action lawsuits due to the large
number of clients and their various interests). For a discussion of the conflict between the class
counsel’s financial interests and the class’s financial interests, see John C. Coffee, Jr., The
Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class
Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 884–85 (1987) (“[N]o public market exists in the case of the
attorney–client relationship to motivate the attorney to serve the client's interests.”); Benjamin P.
Edwards & Anthony Rickey, Uncovering the Hidden Conflicts in Securities Class Action
Litigation: Lessons from the State Street Case, BUS. LAW., Winter 2019-2020, at 1551, 1552
(“Enticed by lucrative class action awards, class counsel may pursue cases more with a view
toward maximizing law firm profit than vindicating stockholder rights.”); Bruce Hay & David
Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1377–78 (2000) (“A number of recent class action settlements have
been criticized on the ground that class counsel had in effect ‘sold out’ the class members.”). For
a discussion of the conflict when one lawyer represents different classes in different actions
against the same defendant, see Richard G. Stuhan & Sean P. Costello, Robbing Peter to Pay
Paul: The Conflict of Interest Problem in Sibling Class Actions, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1195,
1195, 1198 (2008) (describing what issues and conflicts of interest lawyers face when bringing
“sibling” class actions against the same defendant).
15. For acknowledgements of this problem, see Mary Kay Kane, Of Carrots and Sticks:
Evaluating the Role of the Class Action Lawyer, 66 TEX. L. REV. 385, 391 n.42, 396, 398–99
(1987); Moore, supra note 6, at 1489, 1497–98, 1500–01; Developments in the Law—Conflicts of
Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1244, 1446–54 (1981). For a summary
rejection of the suggestion that a conflict could be posed for class counsel by also representing an
absent class member individually, see Borum v. Brentwood Vill. LLC, No. 16-1723, 2019 WL
2437686, at *11 (D.D.C. June 11, 2019).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
346489-FLR_72-5_Text.indd 143

5
9/29/20 7:36 AM

Florida Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 5 [], Art. 3

1088

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

class, and will “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”16
Moreover, the class representatives agree to assume fiduciary duties to
the class.17 But, in fact, the class representatives’ interests may diverge
from those of the class, either because the individuals’ interests are not
perfectly aligned with those of the class as a whole,18 or because the class
action procedure enables them to benefit financially at the class’s
expense.19 Notwithstanding their fiduciary undertaking, representative
plaintiffs may act in their own self-interest.20 Courts know this because
published decisions describe situations where class counsel could not
competently and loyally represent both the class and a self-interested
class representative.21 But courts do not require class counsel to avoid
this risk by withdrawing from the representation of individual class
members when the class is certified.22 Nor would that entirely solve the
problem, since lawyers are expected to act in the interest of the putative
class even prior to class certification.23
This Article explores the problem of conflicts arising from class
counsel’s concurrent representation of a class and individual

16. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). For an evaluation of the standards governing the adequacy of class
representatives, see Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 624–26, 626 n.20 (1996);
Debra Lyn Bassett, When Reform is Not Enough: Assuring More Than Merely “Adequate”
Representation in Class Actions, 38 GA. L. REV. 927, 950–58 (2004).
17. See In re Sw. Airlines Voucher Litig., 799 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 2015) (stating that
named plaintiffs have “fiduciary duties to the class”); In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 404 F.3d
173, 198 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he lead plaintiff serves as a fiduciary for the entire class.”); Shelton
v. Pargo, Inc., 582 F.2d 1298, 1305 (4th Cir. 1978) (stating that from the time a class complaint
is filed, class representatives have “a fiduciary obligation towards the members of the putative
class they thus have undertaken to represent”).
18. See RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, § 19:7 (“Counsel in a class action lawsuit
represents both one or more individual clients (as class representatives) and a large group of absent
class members. It is somewhat inevitable that there will be fissures within such a large group of
litigants.”); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 8.14, at 492 (1986) (“Conflict is
rife within the structure of the class itself. Most obviously, the class representative may have
interests and goals that in fact are not shared by represented but absent class members.”); Miller,
supra note 14, at 581 (observing that “[c]onflicts of interest pervade class action litigation” in part
because of “the potential for members of the class to be differently situated”).
19. See infra Part II.
20. See, e.g., Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy of Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1137,
1151 (2009) (describing the “indifference” to the class’s interests of “class
representatives . . . who are willing to represent the interests of class members only to the extent
that such representations serve their own interests”).
21. See infra Part I.
22. See infra Section II.A.
23. See infra Section I.A.
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representative plaintiffs.24 It analyzes lawyers’ duties and conflicts from
the perspective of both federal court caselaw and the ethics rules adopted
throughout the United States based on the American Bar Association’s
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (ABA Model Rules).25 Ethics rules
expressly address class actions only sporadically and provide little
specific guidance.26 Further, as discussed below, some courts and
commentators believe in disregarding ethics rules when they conflict with
the goals and policies of class actions.27 Nevertheless, exploring the
conflicts in class actions through the lens of conflict-of-interest rules28
and doctrine is illumining because the ethics rules encapsulate widely
shared, long-persisting views about conflicts that are deeply influential.29
And the conflict rules govern all lawyers, including plaintiff-side class
action lawyers. Even if the rules might be a poor fit for a class
representation—a possibility addressed below30—the rules and the client
interests they protect are indisputably relevant to assessing how class
action lawyers are treating their individual clients. The rules’ framework
provides a valuable benchmark against which to measure how well class
action decisional law addresses the conflicts discussed here. Although
this Article supports federal courts’ current approach of addressing
conflicts primarily via case-by-case adjudication based on policies
specific to class actions, highlighting how and where current caselaw has
departed from the ethics rules helps ground suggestions for reforming
caselaw.

24. The same issues may arise when class counsel also represents an absent class member
as an individual client. However, this Article focuses on the representation of lead plaintiffs.
25. See Alphabetical List of Jurisdictions Adopting Model Rules, A.B.A.,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_
professional_conduct/alpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules/ [https://perma.cc/35GB-GSAF].
California adopted new rules based on the ABA Model Rules effective in November 2018. See
News Release, State Bar of California, New Rules of Prof’l Conduct Effective November (Nov. 1,
2018),
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/About-Us/News-Events/News-Releases/new-rules-ofprofessional-conduct-effective-november-1 [https://perma.cc/GMN9-ARC6].
26. See Moore, supra note 6, at 1478.
27. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
28. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018)
(providing conflict-of-interest rules for current clients); Id. at r. 1.8 (providing additional conflictof-interest rules governing specific issues with current clients); Id. at r. 1.9 (providing conflict-ofinterest rules for former clients).
29. See Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of Interest in Litigation: The Judicial Role, 65 FORDHAM
L. REV. 71, 99 (1996) (“The conflict rules, promulgated by courts based on the ABA models, are
rooted in common law principles that are more than a century old.”).
30. See infra Section I.B.
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Ethics rules recognize that lawyers have a “concurrent conflict of
interest” if “there is a significant risk that the representation of one or
more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to
another client.”31 The conflict can be waived if the affected clients give
informed consent in writing and the lawyer “reasonably believes” that she
“will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each
affected client.”32 Federal courts addressing conflicts issues in class
actions often acknowledge this standard but freely adopt their own
approach when they disagree with what the ethics rules seem to require.33
Federal courts and commentators frequently suggest that conflicts rules
cannot be “mechanically” applied to the class action setting,34 and that if
ethics rules conflict with the needs of making class actions viable, the
ethics rules must be relaxed or give way entirely.35 For example, courts
often do not disqualify class counsel who have what would ordinarily be
a disabling conflict of interest.36 This Article illuminates what is lost
when the ABA Model Rules ethics framework for conflicts is ignored or
relaxed in class action practice.
This Article begins by exploring the magnitude of the overlooked
problem. Because a lawyer’s duties with regard to conflicts can be
defined and analyzed by reference to identified clients, Part I provides
necessary background by discussing the surprisingly unresolved question
of who class counsel’s clients are at various stages of litigation. Part I
also sets out the standard view among courts and commentators about
how class representatives and absent class members should be protected
from conflicts. Part II then describes three recurring situations where the
respective interests of a class and the class representatives may diverge,
at times dramatically, with the result that one lawyer could not loyally
and competently serve both the class and its representative. Part III
considers whether the joint representation constitutes a conflict of interest
31. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
32. Id. at r. 1.7(b).
33. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
34. E.g., In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litig., 317 F.3d 91, 102 (2d Cir. 2003)
(“[T]he traditional rules concerning conflict-free representation, applicable in non-class lawsuits,
‘should not be mechanically applied to the problems that arise in the settlement of class action
litigation.’” (quoting In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig. (Agent Orange), 800 F.2d 14, 19
(2d. Cir. 1986))); RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, § 19:1 (“Class action practice has a peculiar
relationship to legal ethics. . . . ‘[C]ourts cannot mechanically transpose to class actions the rules
developed in the traditional lawyer–client setting context.’” (quoting In re Corn Derivatives
Antitrust Litig., 748 F.2d 157, 163 (3d. Cir. 1984))).
35. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., Bash v. Firstmark Standard Life Ins. Co., 861 F.2d 159, 161 (7th Cir. 1988)
(declining to disqualify former class counsel from presenting an unnamed class member’s
challenge to a settlement, finding the conflict of interest not sufficiently “serious”).
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even before a class representative begins acting to the class’s detriment.
First, it discusses whether the conflict of interest exists at the time of class
certification because, looking ahead, there is a significant risk that the
class representative will act self-interestedly. Second, it considers
whether lawyers have a conflict of interest even earlier (upon filing the
class action) when lawyers first assume fiduciary duties to absent class
members or to the nascent class.
This Article then considers the implications of the analysis for
plaintiffs’ lawyers, rulemakers, and trial courts. Part IV argues that before
lawyers file a class action, they must explain how the class action will
limit their ability to act and give advice for the individual’s benefit, and
how they will respond if a conflict of interest later precludes serving both
the client and the class. In doing so, Part IV demonstrates the inadequacy
of courts’ and commentators’ standard approach—namely, that class
counsel will give primary loyalty to the class as a whole, and that the
district court will monitor for and resolve conflicts when they become
overt.
Finally, Part V suggests that federal rulemakers should amend Rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) to clarify that courts
should address class counsel’s conflicts of the type identified here.
Fearing that such an amendment may be unlikely, the remainder of Part
V addresses courts’ responsibility to protect the class under existing law.
It asks whether trial judges have a responsibility under FRCP Rule 23 to
forbid, or impose conditions on, a lawyer’s joint representation of an
individual class representative and the class or nascent class. This Part
also discusses the implications of this dilemma for courts exercising their
responsibility to interpret both professional conduct rules and civil
procedure rules, as well as their responsibility to supervise class actions
and class counsel to protect the interests of the class and ensure lawyers’
compliance with professional expectations. Among other things, this
Article concludes that courts should clarify the applicability of conflict
rules to class actions, and that they should clarify class counsel’s
responsibilities to the class vis-à-vis class representatives at different
stages of the lawsuit.
In undertaking this inquiry, this Article focuses on practice in federal
courts, where most class actions are filed.37 Although this Article’s
analysis may also apply to collective actions brought under the Fair Labor
37. See Morris A. Ratner, Class Conflicts, 92 WASH. L. REV. 785, 843 (2017) (observing
that the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 “has successfully shifted much class practice to federal
court”).
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Standards Act (FLSA),38 this Article excludes such suits from coverage.
Both class actions and FLSA collective actions involve lead plaintiffs and
lead counsel controlling a suit on behalf of other similarly situated
plaintiffs; however, the FLSA expressly provides that all aggregated
plaintiffs have the status of formal parties.39 Thus, there are no “absent”
class members in a formal sense in FLSA litigation. Nor does this Article
address non-class aggregate litigation,40 although multi-district litigation
(MDL) aggregation has much in common with class action
representation.41 This Article’s analysis may have broader implications,
but federal class actions afford a significant enough area on which to
focus initially.
I. CURRENT LAW AND PRACTICE: WHO IS THE CLIENT AND HOW
SHOULD CLASS CONFLICTS BE ADDRESSED?
Even after decades of litigation under FRCP Rule 23,42 basic but
crucial questions remain uncertain: Who or what are the clients of the
class action lawyer? At what stage do client or client-like relationships
begin? What duties and responsibilities do class counsel have? What
rights and responsibilities do clients have? Can ethics rules (based on the
38. Pub. L. No. 718-676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 201–
219 (2018)).
39. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); see also Halle v. W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys. Inc., 842 F.3d
215, 225 (3d Cir. 2016) (discussing this difference between FRCP Model class actions and FLSA
collective actions).
40. As it has become harder to certify mass tort cases as class actions, aggregation of those
cases has increasingly occurred through the multi-district litigation (MDL) procedures in federal
court. See Andrew D. Bradt, “A Radical Proposal”: The Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968, 165
U. PA. L. REV. 831, 833 (2017); William B. Rubenstein, Procedure and Society: An Essay for
Steve Yeazell, 61 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 136, 144 n.40 (2013). Mass tort cases aggregated via
MDL differ in relevant respects from the class actions this Article addresses: All plaintiffs
individually retain lawyers and negotiate individual contracts with them, and those representations
continue as both a formal and practical matter throughout the litigation. See Morris A. Ratner,
Achieving Procedural Goals Through Indirection: The Use of Ethics Doctrine to Justify
Contingency Fee Caps in MDL Aggregate Settlements, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 59, 64 (2013).
41. For instance, the court appoints a small subset of plaintiffs’ lawyers as lead counsel to
perform common benefit work for all plaintiffs, see Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal,
63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 118–19 (2010), and the lawyers operate largely autonomously from client
control, see Charles Silver, The Responsibilities of Lead Lawyers and Judges in Multidistrict
Litigations, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1985, 1986 (2011).
42. The first amendment to the class action rule (FRCP Rule 23) was adopted in 1966. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment. Use of the class action device
increased substantially after these amendments. See Scott Dodson, A Negative Retrospective of
Rule 23, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 917, 921 (2017) (describing the effects of the 1966 amendment).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol72/iss5/3
346489-FLR_72-5_Text.indd 148

10
9/29/20 7:36 AM

Green and Kent: May Class Counsel Also Represent Lead Plaintiffs

2020]

MAY CLASS COUNSEL ALSO REPRESENT LEAD PLAINTIFFS?

1093

ABA Model Rules) about client identity, conflicts of interest, and other
topics, written for non-class actions, be applied to class actions also, or
must ethics rules be ignored, or at least substantially modified, in the class
action context?
A. The Unresolved Problem of Identifying the Clients
Before filing a class action or seeking appointment as lead counsel in
a putative class action filed by another, a lawyer ordinarily establishes an
attorney–client relationship in the matter with one or more members of
the prospective class.43 The lawyer’s ethical and fiduciary duties of
loyalty, competence, and confidentiality belong exclusively to the
individual client.44 The clarity of the lawyer’s role ends there, however.
After filing the class action complaint but prior to certification,
counsel has no “formal” attorney–client relationship with the putative
class45 but, according to caselaw and official commentary on FRCP Rule
23, “generally must act in the class’s best interests.”46 Interim counsel for
a putative class may be, but need not be, formally designated by the
district court under FRCP 23(g)(3).47 Commentary on the ABA Model
Rules states that a lawyer seeking to represent a class is not “ordinarily”
considered to have an attorney–client relationship with putative absent
class members for purposes of the principal rule on concurrent conflicts
of interest, ABA Model Rule 1.7(a).48
43. See RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, § 19:2. Some lawyers specify that the relationship
extends only to deciding whether to seek appointment as lead plaintiff and class counsel, and
litigating any class certification motion that the lawyer determines to file, and that the
representation will end if the lawyer decides not to proceed or the judge denies appointment. See,
e.g., Geoffrey L. Flagstad Retainer Agreement at 2, City of Cape Coral Mun. Firefighters’ Ret.
Plan v. Emergent Biosolutions, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 3d 676 (D. Md. 2018) (No. 8:16-cv-02625),
ECF No. 80-14 (“If the court does not certify the case as a class action, we will discuss
representing you on an individual basis.”).
44. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 25 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
45. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 07-445 (2007)
(“A client–lawyer relationship with a potential member of the class does not begin until the class
has been certified and the time for opting out by a potential member of the class has expired.”).
46. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, § 19:2; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory
committee’s note to 2003 amendment (“Whether or not formally designated interim counsel, an
attorney who acts on behalf of the class before certification must act in the best interests of the
class as a whole.”).
47. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(3).
48. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 25 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). The rule
provides that: “(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if:
(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or (2) there is a
significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the
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After a class is certified and a lawyer is appointed to serve as class
counsel, the lawyer owes the class most—but not all—of the ethical and
fiduciary duties of loyalty that lawyers ordinarily owe to clients.49 Class
counsel are said to be fiduciaries for the class as a whole.50 This means
that class counsel may not serve their own interests, or someone else’s
interests, such as those of a different client, to the detriment of the class.51
In deciding whether to appoint a particular lawyer to serve as class
counsel, courts are supposed to look closely at allegations that the lawyer
in question owes duties to others or has personal interests that will
compromise the lawyer’s ability to give undivided loyalty to the class.52
Importantly, class counsel’s duty of loyalty is to the entire class, not
to any particular class member.53 Most courts and commentators believe
that class counsel has a primary duty to the class and only a secondary
duty to individual class members, even if there exists an attorney–client
agreement to press individual claims in addition to class claims. The
Advisory Committee Notes to the 2003 amendments to FRCP Rule 23,
lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest
of the lawyer.” Id. at r. 1.7.
49. See, e.g., id. at r. 1.7 cmt. 25 (“[Class counsel] does not typically need to get the consent
of such a[n unnamed member of the class] before representing a client suing the [unnamed class
member] in an unrelated matter. Similarly, a lawyer seeking to represent an opponent in a class
action does not typically need the consent of an unnamed member of the class whom the lawyer
represents in an unrelated matter.”).
50. See, e.g., Keepseagle v. Perdue, 856 F.3d 1039, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (indicating that
class counsel have a fiduciary duty to serve “the best interests of the class as a whole”); In re Sw.
Airlines Voucher Litig., 799 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 2015) (stating that class counsel have
“fiduciary duties to the class”); In re Dry Max Pampers Litig., 724 F.3d 713, 718 (6th Cir. 2013)
(noting that the law relies on class counsel’s fiduciary obligations to the class to protect the class’s
interests); Rodriguez v. West Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 968 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[C]lass counsel’s
fiduciary duty is to the class as a whole . . . .”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(4) (“Class counsel
must fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class.”); RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note
1, § 19:20 (“The class counsel-class representative relationship within the class action is treated
as an attorney–client relationship.”).
51. See Sondel v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 934, 938–39 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that
“certified representatives and the class counsel assume[] certain fiduciary responsibilities to the
Class,” and as a result, “the certified representatives may not take any action which will prejudice
the Class’s interest, or further their personal interests at the expense of the Class”).
52. See In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg, Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., 895
F.3d 597, 607–08, 607 n.14 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2645 (2019); In re Pharm.
Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 588 F.3d 24, 36 & n.12 (1st Cir. 2009); MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.271, at 279 (2004).
53. See Radcliffe v. Experian Info. Sols., 715 F.3d 1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Class
counsel has a fiduciary duty to the class as a whole . . . .”); In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig.
(Agent Orange), 800 F.2d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1986) (“[T]he class attorney’s duty does not run just to
the plaintiff's named in the caption of the case; it runs to all of the members of the class.”).
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which added subsection (g) concerning appointment of class counsel,
state that “the primary responsibility of class counsel, resulting from
appointment as class counsel, is to represent the best interests of the class.
The rule thus establishes the obligation of class counsel, an obligation
that may be different from the customary obligations of counsel to
individual clients.”54 This commentary apparently arose from debates
about whether to adopt an “entity concept of the class,” under which the
role of class representatives would decline or perhaps be eliminated.55
A leading civil procedure treatise goes further than the Advisory
Committee Notes in sidelining the individual in favor of the “class as a
whole”:
The appointed class counsel represents the interests of the
class as a whole, however, not the interest of the class
representatives, and must be guided accordingly.
. . . [A] formal court appointment as class counsel will
inevitably shift the attorney’s allegiance from the attorney’s
former client (the named plaintiffs) to the attorney’s new
client (the class).56
This treatise goes too far in suggesting that the lead plaintiffs have
become “former” clients of class counsel. Most lawyers, courts, and
commentators view the individual attorney–client relationship with
named plaintiffs as continuing, albeit in modified form. 57 In fact, some
retainer agreements suggest that the attorney–client relationship formed
prior to class certification generally is understood to continue.58 But the
54. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 2003 amendment.
55. See Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 13, 26–28 (1996)
56. 5 JEROLD S. SOLOVY ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE – CIVIL § 23:120[2][c][i]
(2020) (footnote omitted).
57. See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d
768, 801 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Beyond their ethical obligations to their clients, class attorneys,
purporting to represent a class, also owe the entire class a fiduciary duty once the class complaint
is filed.”); Agent Orange, 800 F.2d at 18 (“[T]he class attorney’s duty does not run just to the
plaintiffs named in the caption of the case; it runs to all of the members of the class.”); RUBENSTEIN
ET AL., supra note 1, § 19:2 (“[A]n attorney seeking to represent, or representing, a class will
almost certainly have an attorney–client relationship with the class representatives. . . . If the class
is certified, the individual client likely becomes the class representative and remains a client for
all purposes.” (emphasis omitted)).
58. See, e.g., Retainer Agreement—Class Action, Savanna Grp., Inc. v. Truan, No. 1:10cv-07995, 2013 WL 4734004 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2013), ECF No. 137-34; Authorization, Pronesti
v. Acument Glob. Tech., No. 2:08-cv-15086 (E.D. Mich. filed Dec. 9, 2008), ECF No. 16-5;
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treatise does capture the common view that after certification class
counsel’s primary loyalty is to the class as a whole, which must be
preferred over lead plaintiffs—whether or not they are also individual
clients—and absent class members.59
This “solution” would fail in a regular setting of an attorney with two
concurrent clients with conflicting interests. Under the ABA Model
Rules, a lawyer who undertakes a joint representation may not favor one
co-client over another: doing so would be the very definition of a conflict
of interest.60
Although class counsel has something akin to an attorney–client
relationship with those appointed by the court to serve as class
representatives61—for example, class counsel must consult with class
representatives62—this is not an ordinary attorney–client relationship.
Confirmation of Retainer Agreement, In re Dell Inc., Secs. Litig., No. 1:06-cv-00726, 2010 WL
2371834 (W.D. Tex. June 11, 2010), ECF No. 242-4, aff’d sub nom. Union Asset Mgmt. Holding
A.G. v. Dell, Inc., 669 F.3d 632 (Feb. 7, 2012).
59. See, e.g., Maywalt v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 67 F.3d 1072, 1078 (2d Cir.
1995) (“The attorneys themselves have an obligation to all of the class members, and ‘when a
potential conflict arises between the named plaintiffs and the rest of the class, the class attorney
must not allow decisions on behalf of the class to rest exclusively with the named plaintiffs.’”
(quoting Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe, 576 F.2d 1157, 1176 (5th Cir. 1978))); Walsh v. Great
Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 726 F.2d 956, 964 (3d Cir. 1983) (“Class counsel’s duty to the class as a
whole frequently diverges from the opinion of either the named plaintiff or other objectors.”);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 128 cmt. d(iii) (stating that, in case
of serious differences within class or between class representatives and absent class members,
“the lawyer may proceed in what the lawyer reasonably concludes to be the best interests of the
of the class as a whole”); RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, § 19:25 (stating that, when a class
representative and individual client becomes an objector to class action settlement, “class action
law unambiguously places upon class counsel a duty to act in the class’s best interest”); MANUAL
FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.641, at 323 (2004) (“Class counsel must discuss with
the class representatives the terms of any settlement offered to the class. Approval or rejection of
the offer by the representatives, however, does not end the attorneys’ obligations, because they
must act in the best interests of the class as a whole.” (footnote omitted)).
60. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
61. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14 cmt. f (“Class
actions may pose difficult questions of client identification. For many purposes, the named class
representatives are the clients of the lawyer for the class.”); RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1,
§ 19:2 (“[R]egardless of whether the class representative was initially an individual client of class
counsel, once a court certifies a class and appoints class representatives and class counsel, those
parties have an attorney–client relationship with one another.”); cf. id. § 19:2 (“[O]nce a class has
been certified, the default presumption is that there is an attorney–client relationship between class
counsel and the absent class members.”).
62. See, e.g., Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 117 F.3d 571, 575 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(finding proposed class representatives adequate in part because of good “communication
between class counsel and the class”); Doe v. Briley, No. 3:73-cv-6971, 2016 WL 6125437, at *5
(M.D. Tenn. Oct. 20, 2016) (stating that class counsel violated ethical rules requiring consultation
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The class action lawyer does not take direction from the named plaintiffs,
as a lawyer would from a client.63 “[A] class representative may not
singlehandedly veto a proposed settlement,”64 whereas under the ABA
Model Rules, a client has an absolute right to reject any proposed
settlement.65 Under standard agency law principles, a client has the nearabsolute right to access the lawyer’s files about her case.66 But class
representatives generally do not have any unfettered right to access.67 In
a standard attorney–client representation, the client has the absolute right
to fire her lawyer for any reason at any time; the only qualification is that
the client’s discharge of counsel is subject to court approval if litigation
has been filed.68 But a class representative has no “right to replace class
with clients when negotiated on behalf of class without consulting or even knowing how to contact
lead plaintiff); Byes v. Telecheck Recovery Servs., Inc., 173 F.R.D. 421, 427–29 (E.D. La. 1997)
(finding the putative class counsel inadequate because, among other reasons, he did not convey
information to the class representative about settlement offers); cf. Olden v. Gardner, 294 F.
App’x 210, 220 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Class representatives are expected to protect the interests of the
class. This requires that the class representatives exercise some oversight of the class counsel so
as to avoid simply turning the conduct of the case over to the class counsel.” (citation omitted)).
But see Banyai v. Mazur, No. 00-Civ-9806, 2004 WL 1948755, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2004)
(rejecting a motion to replace class counsel and stating that counsel has the authority to exclude
class representatives from settlement negotiations).
63. Class counsel have been called “clientless” lawyers to capture the idea that the lawyer
does not take direction from anyone—neither from an individual client nor from a legally
authorized representative of a client. See THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005, S. REP. NO.
109-14, at 33 (2005) (stating the class actions “often involve numerous plaintiffs, each of whom
has only a small financial stake in the litigation,” and that, “[a]s a result, few (if any) plaintiffs
closely monitor the progress of the case or settlement negotiations, and these cases become
‘clientless litigation’”); Coffee, supra note 6, at 384 (“[T]he class representative is usually a token
figure, with the class counsel being the real party in interest.”); Russell M. Gold, “Clientless”
Lawyers, 92 WASH. L. REV. 87, 111 (2017) (“[T]he lawyer, rather than the client, has to make the
critical decisions in ‘clientless’ litigation . . . .”); cf. Cooper, supra note 55, at 27 (“A familiar
concern is that class counsel in fact are the class . . . .”).
64. Hayes v. Harmony Gold Mining Co., 509 F. App’x 21, 23 (2d Cir. 2013); accord In re
Ivan F. Boesky Sec. Litig., 948 F.2d 1358, 1366 (2d Cir. 1991); In re FedEx Ground Package
Sys., Inc. Emp’t Practices Litig., No. 3:05-MD-527 RLM, 2017 WL 632119, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Feb.
14, 2017); see 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23:120[2][c][ii]
(Daniel R. Coquillette et al. eds., 3d ed. 2017). In one case, a court approved a settlement despite
objections from nine out of the eleven class representatives. See Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d
1204, 1207–08 (5th Cir. 1982).
65. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a), 1.8(g) (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2018); see also
Kincade v. Gen. Tire & Rubber Co., 635 F.2d 501, 508 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that, “[b]ecause
of the unique nature of the attorney–client relationship in a class action,” the ordinary rule that an
attorney cannot settle without approval of the client is “simply inapplicable”).
66. See Wyly v. Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman, LLP, 908 N.E.2d 888, 889–90 (N.Y.
2009).
67. See, e.g., id.
68. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(a)(3), (c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
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counsel at will.”69 In the typical attorney–client relationship, the client
and lawyer privately negotiate a fee, subject to only extremely loose
regulation under ethics rules.70 In a class action, however, the court sets
class counsel’s fee.71 Unlike in an ordinary representation, class counsel
is not obligated, or even permitted, to loyally and competently pursue the
individual class representative’s interests as distinct from those of the
class members collectively.72 Rather, the lawyer is responsible to do what
is in the class’s best interest, which may at times be contrary to the named
plaintiffs’ preferences.
Absent class members’ relationships with class counsel are even less
like an attorney–client relationship. Clients ordinarily decide whether to
sue.73 But class counsel initiates class actions and seeks certification
without the knowledge or approval of absent class members. Many will
never have any communication with counsel, or even know the litigation
exists, until receiving an opt-out notice or settlement notice. Like class
representatives, absent class members lack standard client rights, such as
the ability to veto a settlement.74 The commentary to the ABA Model
Rules recognizes that because “unnamed members of the class are
ordinarily not considered to be clients of the lawyer for purposes of
applying” the conflict-of-interest rule, class counsel may sue an absent
class member in an unrelated matter.75 Federal courts and commentary
on class action practice agree.76
The notion that class counsel’s primary duty is to an abstract-sounding
entity—the class “as a whole”—rather than to individuals, has led some
69. Maywalt v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 67 F.3d 1072, 1078 (2d Cir. 1995); see
also MOORE ET AL., supra note 64, § 23:120[2][c][iv] (“Class representatives do not have the
unfettered right to discharge an appointed counsel.”).
70. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (“A lawyer shall
not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee . . . .”).
71. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h); see also Alexandra D. Lahav, Two Views of the Class Action,
79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1939, 1943 (2011) (“The law does not allow class members to choose their
attorney, to fire her, or to determine her compensation.”).
72. See Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204, 1210–11 (5th Cir. 1982).
73. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
74. See 4 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, § 13:58 (“[E]ven a large group of objections
will not necessarily doom a proposed settlement, particularly if the ‘apparently high
number . . . reflect[s] an organized campaign, rather than the sentiments of the class at large.’”
(second alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION
(FOURTH) § 21062)).
75. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 25 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
76. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, § 19:2 (“[C]ourts and commentators have held that
absent class members, even after class certification, are not clients for some conflicts purposes,
meaning that class counsel may be adverse to absent class members in other matters unrelated to
the class action.”).
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commentators to look for analogies. Many compare the class to a single
entity like a corporation.77 But class counsel’s role differs from that of a
corporation’s lawyer.78 Corporate lawyers take direction from duly
authorized corporate officers,79 whereas class counsel makes decisions
for the class. Likewise, class counsel’s role differs from that of a
fiduciary’s lawyer, such as a lawyer for an estate administrator, for a
court-appointed guardian, or for a trustee.80 A fiduciary’s lawyer takes
lawful directions from the fiduciary.81 The fiduciary’s lawyer owes
obligations derivatively to the beneficiary in some circumstances and
thus may have some responsibility to protect the beneficiary from the
fiduciary’s overreaching, but the fiduciary as a client still has a wide
range of discretion in making decisions regarding the representation.82 In
contrast, in a class action, the lawyer represents the class (i.e., the
beneficiary), not the class representative (i.e., the fiduciary), and makes
decisions on behalf of the class. Consequently, a lawyer who represents
only the class must decide independently what is in the class’s best
interest and cannot accept a class representative’s direction to act contrary
to the lawyer’s judgment about what is in the class’s best interest, even if
the question is simply a judgment call.
77. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Assembling Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 699, 704
(2013); Lahav, supra note 71, at 1946; David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and
Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 917 (1998).
78. See Moore, supra note 6, at 1487 n.59 (discussing responsibilities of class counsel,
which differentiate a class from a corporation).
79. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985) (“As
an inanimate entity, a corporation must act through agents. A corporation cannot speak directly
to its lawyers. Similarly, it cannot directly waive the privilege when disclosure is in its best
interest. Each of these actions must necessarily be undertaken by individuals empowered to act
on behalf of the corporation.”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N
2018) (“A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting
through its duly authorized constituents.”).
80. But see Sergio J. Campos, Class Actions and Justiciability, 66 FLA. L. REV. 553, 565
(2014) (conceptualizing class counsel as a trustee of the class members rather than as a
representative of such a trustee); Martin H. Redish & Megan B. Kiernan, Avoiding Death by a
Thousand Cuts: The Relitigation of Class Certification and the Realities of the Modern Class
Action, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1659, 1662 (2014) (same).
81. Cf. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-380 (1994) (“The
majority of jurisdictions consider that a lawyer who represents a fiduciary does not also represent
the beneficiaries, and we understand the Model Rules to reflect this majority view.” (citation
omitted)).
82. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 cmt. 11 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018); Victoria
White & Thomas G. Wilkinson Jr., Ethics Digest, PA. LAW., July/Aug. 2018, at 54, 56; cf. Heyer
v. Flaig, 449 P.2d 161, 163 (Cal. 1969) (“An attorney who negligently fails to fulfill a client’s
testamentary directions incurs liability in tort for violating a duty of care owed directly to the
intended beneficiaries.”).
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B. The Standard View of Handling Conflicts in Class Action Practice
Caselaw and leading commentary reflect a standard four-part
approach to conflicts in class actions. Although courts and commentators
only rarely acknowledge the conflict this Article addresses, the federal
judiciary and leading commentators probably assume that the four-part
approach sufficiently addresses all of class counsel’s conflicts, including
any conflict in jointly representing a class and a class representative as an
individual.
First, to the extent that applying ethics rules would appear to make
class actions less useful or more complex, courts often state that
traditional conflicts rules should be relaxed or ignored.83 Second, as
noted, in resolving conflicts issues, courts prefer the class “as a whole”
over the individual.84
Third, the district court must act as a “fiduciary” for absent class
members to protect their best interests.85 As the Federal Judicial Center
has said, “Unlike other civil litigation, many class action suits do not
involve a client who chooses a lawyer, negotiates the terms of the
engagement, and monitor’s the lawyer’s performance. Those tasks, by
83. See, e.g., Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 166 F.3d 581, 589–90 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating
that courts should not apply disqualification rules automatically in class actions because automatic
disqualification would have a serious adverse effect on class actions); Bash v. Firstmark Standard
Life Ins. Co., 861 F.2d 159, 161 (7th Cir. 1988) (“Recognizing that strict application of rules on
attorney conduct that were designed with simpler litigation in mind might make the class-action
device unworkable in many cases, the courts insist that a serious conflict be shown before they
will take remedial or disciplinary action.”); In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig. (Agent
Orange), 800 F.2d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1986) (reviewing ordinary ethics rules and suggesting that
“[c]lass action litigation presents additional problems that must be considered in determining
whether or not to disqualify an attorney”); In re Corn Derivatives Antitrust Litig., 748 F.2d 157,
163 (3d Cir. 1984) (Adams, J., concurring) (stating that the “traditional [lawyer ethics] model
cannot be carried over unmodified to the class action arena”); RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1,
§ 19:25 (“[I]f the normal rule requiring disqualification applied, class actions would be nearly
impossible to pursue, and hence the values served by such suits would be compromised.”); cf.
Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 101, 103 (1981) (overturning a district court order that
barred solicitation and other communications by putative class counsel with class members on the
ground that it interfered with FRCP Rule 23 goals for class actions).
84. Supra notes 50, 56, 59 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., Flanagan, Lieberman, Hoffman & Swaim v. Ohio Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 814
F.3d 652, 657 (2d Cir. 2016); Ehrheart v. Verizon Wireless, 609 F.3d 590, 594 (3d Cir. 2010);
Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 968 (9th Cir. 2009); In re Wireless Tel. Fed. Cost
Recovery Fees Litig., 396 F.3d 922, 932 (8th Cir. 2005); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust
Litig., 643 F.2d 195, 225 (5th Cir. 1981); Ray v. Mechel Bluestone, Inc., No. 5:15-cv-03014, 2018
WL 1309731, at *4 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 13, 2018); Jackson v. Innovative Sec. Servs., LLC, 283
F.R.D. 13, 15 (D.D.C. 2012); In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 345 F. Supp. 2d 135,
138 (D. Mass. 2004); 4 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, § 13:40.
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default, fall to the judge . . . .”86 The notion of a judge as a fiduciary
protecting the interests of one side of a contested litigation is, of course,
inconsistent with the standard view of the United States’ adversary
system.87
Fourth and finally, courts emphasize that class counsel has a duty to
inform the court of any potential conflicts so they can be aired and, if
necessary, resolved by court action.88 The Federal Judicial Center, for
example, states that class counsel must disclose to the court “any facet of
[a proposed] settlement that may adversely affect any member of the class
or may result in unequal treatment of class members.”89 This, of course,
stands in some tension with an attorney’s ordinary duty to preserve client
confidences under agency law and ethics rules.90
Undue confidence in this general four-part approach may have led the
judiciary and most commentators to ignore the pervasive conflict this
Article addresses, which occurs when class counsel has an individual
attorney–client relationship with a class representative.
II. CLASS COUNSEL’S CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN REPRESENTING CLASS
REPRESENTATIVES
A lawyer’s concurrent or joint representation of a class and an
individual class representative in connection with a class action lawsuit
entails at least the possibility of a conflict of interest, as would a litigator’s
joint representation of spouses, of a corporation and its principal, or of
any other co-clients. But there is nothing to suggest that lawyers for the
class identify this as a conflict-of-interest problem commanding analysis
under the conflict rules, which call initially for deciding whether the
86. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH), supra note 74, § 21.27, at 278.
87. A fiduciary must act in the best interests of the client or beneficiary. See, e.g., Fiduciary
Duty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining “fiduciary duty” in part as “a duty to
act with the highest degree of honesty and loyalty toward another person and in the best interests
of the other person”). But it violates the Due Process Clause for a judge to be actually biased or
appear to be biased in favor of one party over another. See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal
Co., 556 U.S. 868, 883–84 (2009).
88. See, e.g., Radcliffe v. Experian Info. Sols. Inc., 715 F.3d 1157, 1161, 1167 (9th Cir.
2013); In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litig., 317 F.3d 91, 103–04 (2d Cir. 2003);
Agent Orange, 800 F.2d at 18; Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1176 (5th Cir.
1978); Nat’l Ass’n of Reg’l Med. Programs, Inc. v. Mathews, 551 F.2d 340, 346 n.31 (D.C. Cir.
1976); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 128 cmt. d(iii).
89. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH), supra note 74, § 21.641, at 324.
90. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (deeming
“information relating to the representation” as confidential information). This Article does not
contend that class counsel violates this Rule. Arguably disclosures of the type discussed in the
main text are “impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation.” Id.
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representation of one client is significantly likely to be limited by the
lawyer’s responsibilities to another.91 And there is certainly nothing in
the professional literature to suggest that lawyers sever their relationships
with the individual class members after filing a class action, or that
lawyers are expected to do so.
Further, there are various reasons why, if allowed to do so, lawyers
would prefer to maintain the original individual attorney–client
relationships after filing a class action lawsuit. First, a promise to
maintain the individual client relationship even after class certification
may help induce the client to hire the lawyer in the first place. Second, if
the class action is not certified, the lawyer may want to return to
representing the clients in pursuing individual claims, particularly when
individual claims have significant monetary value. Third, preserving the
individual relationship may facilitate the receipt of fees for work relating
to the individual representation before the class action was filed. Fourth,
preserving the relationship may (for better or worse) help maintain a good
relationship with the class representative in acting as a fiduciary for the
benefit of the class. Class counsel might desire this because it would be
in the class’s best interest or, alternatively, because class counsel, seeking
to maximize their private interests, desire less oversight by class
representatives. Lastly, class counsel may perceive it to be disloyal or
disadvantageous to the client to terminate the original, individual
representation upon appointment as class counsel.
The concurrent representation of a class (or putative class) and an
individual serving (or proposing to serve) as class representative would
not be problematic if the individual client’s interests were always
perfectly aligned with those of the class throughout the lawsuit. But their
interests may in fact diverge because the class representative’s interest in
obtaining the most favorable outcome individually may differ from the
class’s interest in obtaining the best outcome for the class members
collectively. Thus, the class representative may have opportunities to
further its individual self-interest at the class’s expense.
Divergence of interests between class representatives and the class as
a whole could, in theory, be present in any class action. But in practice,
the prevalence and strength of divergence will likely often vary with
factors such as the nature of the injury, the nature of the legal claim, and
the type of relief sought. For example, a cause of action with a statutory
damages cap will provide different incentives for plaintiffs than one
91. See id. at r. 1.7.
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without one.92 Plaintiffs in mass tort class actions involving serious
injuries or death likely have very strong “interest[s] in individually
controlling the prosecution of”93 their cases—interests stronger than
those of plaintiffs with, for example, very low-stakes consumer law
claims.94 Keeping in mind the diversity of factors that may influence
plaintiffs’ incentives and decision-making in the class action context, this
Article reviews three scenarios in which divergences of interest between
class representatives and absent class members are likely to arise.
A. Holdouts
Even though a class representative’s claims must be “typical” of those
asserted by the class,95 that representative’s personal interests may differ
from those of class members in ways that may make a settlement more or
less advantageous for the individual.96 For instance, a class representative
might have a greater or lesser appetite for litigation risk than the average
class member, or a different preferred timeframe for realizing the
expected financial or other gains of the litigation. The class representative
may simply disagree with class counsel or other class members about the
advisability of a proposed settlement.97 In any of these cases, the class
may benefit from a settlement that the class representative opposes.98
92. See, e.g., Geismann v. ZocDoc, Inc., 850 F.3d 507, 511 (2d Cir. 2017) (discussing a
class action with claims under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2012),
which contains damages caps).
93. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 616 (1997) (quoting Georgine v.
Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 633 (3d Cir. 1996)), aff'd sub nom. Amchem Prods., Inc., 521
U.S. 591) (involving claims arising from asbestos exposure).
94. See, e.g., Pearson v. NBTY, Inc., 772 F.3d 778, 782 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting that “in
consumer class actions . . . the percentage of class members who file claims is often quite low,”
and well below 1%).
95. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3).
96. Professor Jay Tidmarsh addressed this possibility in an article discussing why particular
class members may not be adequate representatives of the class. See Tidmarsh, supra note 20, at
1179; see also Miller, supra note 14, at 622 (“It is often the case that the proposed representative
plaintiff has features that differ from the class as a whole which may place this individual in some
degree of tension or conflict with other class members.”).
97. See, e.g., In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 588 F.3d 24, 27, 30 (1st
Cir. 2009) (reviewing one named representative’s objections to settlement).
98. Of course, a dispute between class counsel and class representatives may also reflect
that class counsel is acting in counsel’s own self-interest, to the class’s detriment. Courts and
commentators recognize that class counsel may have systematically different preferences about
settlement as compared to class members. See, e.g., Pearson, 772 F.3d at 787; In re Cendant Corp.
Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 254–55 (3d Cir. 2001). For example, class counsel may have incentives to
settle quickly, before investing many resources in litigation, in a way that can cut against the
interests of the class. See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Commentary, Contingent Fees and Class
Actions, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 347, 358 (1998); Coffee, supra note 6, at 390–91; Alon Klement,
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There is obviously a conflict of interest if the class representative
holds out against a settlement that class counsel believes to be in the
class’s best interest; in a fairness hearing,99 the lawyer cannot
simultaneously advocate for the settlement on behalf of the class while
opposing it on behalf of the individual client.100 At that point, under a
traditional ABA Model Rules approach, the lawyer would have to
withdraw from representing the class, the individual client, or both.101 In
class actions, courts rarely require a conflicted class counsel to withdraw
entirely from all representations. For example, in the Agent Orange102
class action, two of the class counsel who served on the plaintiffs’
management committee were permitted to stop representing the class but
to continue representing individual clients in their objections to a
settlement.103 In light of the benefit of having the objections put forth by
lawyers who were familiar with the litigation, the court declined to apply
traditional conflict-of-interest principles, which would likely have
precluded the lawyers from acting adversely to the class, which they had
previously represented in the same matter.104
Conversely, in Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp.,105 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit permitted class counsel to advocate for a
settlement on behalf of the class over the opposition of class
Who Should Guard the Guardians? A New Approach for Monitoring Class Action Lawyers, 21
REV. LITIG. 25, 38–40 (2002).
99. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) (requiring the court, before approving a settlement, to hold
a hearing to determine whether the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate).
100. See, e.g., Flores v. Mamma Lombardi’s of Holbrook, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 3d 290, 311
(E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“That Mr. Romero negotiated a settlement on behalf of the class, then helped
draft objections to that settlement on behalf of certain class members and, finally, reversed
positions again to argue against those objections is most troubling. Worse yet, . . . Mr. Romero
has the unbridled temerity to bill for hours spent consulting on objections to the very settlement
he negotiated on behalf of the class.”).
101. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7, cmt. 4 (“If a conflict arises after
representation has been undertaken, the lawyer ordinarily must withdraw from the representation,
unless the lawyer has obtained the informed consent of the client . . . . Where more than one client
is involved, whether the lawyer may continue to represent any of the clients is determined both
by the lawyer’s ability to comply with duties owed to the former client and by the lawyer’s ability
to represent adequately the remaining client or clients, given the lawyer’s duties to the former
client.” (citation omitted)); N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2005-05
(“[W]hen two clients will not consent to a conflict of interest, and the conflict requires consent,
the law firm must withdraw from representation of at least one of the clients.”).
102. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig. (Agent Orange), 800 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1986).
103. See id. at 19–20.
104. See id. at 18–19. But see In re Corn Derivatives Antitrust Litig., 748 F.2d 157, 161–62
(3d Cir. 1984).
105. 166 F.3d 581 (3d Cir. 1999).
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representatives who were former clients.106 The Lazy Oil court did not
comment on the problem that gave rise to the conflict of interest in the
first place: the lawyers’ concurrent representation of the class and class
representatives. Rather, the court addressed only whether the lawyer,
having withdrawn from representing the objecting individual client,
could represent the class against the objector.107 The court may have
assumed that this problem could have arisen whether or not the lawyer
had jointly represented the class and the individual; the objector would
have been a former client even if the lawyer had ended the individual
representation as soon as the class was certified.
Lazy Oil and cases like it overlook how class counsel’s conflict may
have affected the representation before the lawyer chose sides. Suppose,
for example, that the individual client in Lazy Oil was uncertain whether
to support the proposed settlement and asked for the lawyer’s advice. If
the settlement was in fact disadvantageous to the individual client, the
lawyer could not so advise without being disloyal to the class and
prejudicing its interests. And, having concluded that the class would
benefit from the settlement, the lawyer might not recognize that the
individual client should opt out of, and perhaps even oppose, the
settlement. At that point, class counsel could not give disinterested advice
to the individual.
Or suppose that class counsel had not yet decided whether to advocate
for a possible settlement, and the individual client strongly opposed the
settlement or would be better off without it. At that point, the lawyer
could not make a disinterested judgment on behalf of the class. If the
lawyer represented the class alone, the lawyer would be required to
consider class representatives’ views but not necessarily defer to them. If
class representatives are also individual clients, however, the duties of
loyalty and competence would require the lawyer to seek to carry out their
objectives. In the Agent Orange class action, where multiple class counsel
represented individual claimants with different views, the conflict may
not have prejudiced the class. But in a case where a single class counsel
owes allegiance to a lead plaintiff who is also an individual client, and
who opposes a possible settlement, the lawyer may ultimately decline to
advance the settlement—to the class’s detriment—out of loyalty to the
individual. Class counsel may be influenced unconsciously as well as
106. Id. at 590 (permitting the representation “as long as the interest of the class in continued
representation by experienced counsel is not outweighed by the actual prejudice to the objectors
of being opposed by their former counsel”). Although class counsel may seek court approval for
a settlement even if the representative plaintiff disagrees, the representative plaintiff’s objection
caused the court to scrutinize a proposed settlement more closely.
107. See id.
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consciously; they may not realize that their assessment of the proposed
settlement is influenced by their concern for the class representative’s
personal interests or preferences.
B. Sellouts
Another conflict may arise when the class representative proposes to
settle the individual claim on its own. Nothing in the law forecloses the
putative class representative from settling separately with the defendant
and, if there are no other class representatives, dismissing the class action
lawsuit.108 A certified class representative’s individual claims may also
be settled, with the class action remaining in hiatus while a new class
representative is sought.109 The individual settlement may be a legitimate
response to uncertainties about the viability of a class action. 110 In many
cases, although the individual will be acting self-interestedly, the absent
class members will not be disadvantaged, either because they are
uninterested in filing individual or class claims,111 or because they will

108. See, e.g., Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. of Chi., 834 F.2d 677,
681 (7th Cir. 1987) (“[A] suit begun as a class action may often and quite properly be settled as
an individual action, that is, without preclusive effect on other members of the class . . . .”); cf.
Victorino v. FCA US LLC, 322 F.R.D. 403, 407–08 (S.D. Cal. 2017) (stating that putative class
counsel acted unethically by not communicating a proposed settlement offer to individual clients
who were seeking to be class representatives); Kulig v. Midland Funding, LLC, No. 13-Civ.-4715,
2014 WL 5017817, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2014) (same); Robert Alan Ins. Agency v. Girard
Bank, 107 F.R.D. 271, 275 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (“[I]t is not ‘improper for a potential class
representative on his behalf to attempt, before filing suit, to negotiate a settlement for himself.’”
(quoting Defendants’ Response to Motion for Class Certification at 19, Robert Alan Ins. Agency,
107 F.R.D. 271 (No. 83-2370)). Prior to the 2003 amendments, some courts interpreted FRCP
Rule 23 to require court approval before a putative class representative could settle individually;
it is now clear that this is not required. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 2003
amendment. If a court sees evidence that putative class representatives are using the class
allegations to try to extract individual settlements, the court may make appropriate orders to
protect against “an unintended use of the class action device.” Chateau de Ville Prods., Inc. v.
Tams-Witmark Music Library, Inc., 586 F.2d 962, 965–66 (2d Cir. 1978).
109. Cf. Mars Steel, 834 F.2d at 681 (reasoning that it would be wasteful if individual
settlements were permitted only after a class is certified).
110. Cf. id. at 680 (“Settlement negotiations are made more complicated when the parties
don’t know whether they are trying to settle a class action or an action limited to the named
plaintiffs, don't know whether the named plaintiffs would be deemed adequate representatives of
the class if the case proceeded to trial, and don’t know the composition and size of the class.”).
111. See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768,
784–85 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Another problem is that class actions create the opportunity for a kind of
legalized blackmail: a greedy and unscrupulous plaintiff might use the threat of a large class
action, which can be costly to the defendant, to extract a settlement far in excess of the individual
claims’ [sic] actual worth.” (emphasis omitted)).
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not be prejudiced from now doing so.112 But in other cases, the class
representative may be essentially selling out the class,113 using the class
action for its individual benefit and to the detriment of absent class
members who may find it harder to advance their claims because of the
passage of time, difficulty locating someone else willing to undertake the
burden of being a class representative, or strategic decisions made by
putative class counsel before abandoning the lawsuit.114
If the individual client expresses an interest in pursuing its financial
self-interest by negotiating an individual settlement, the lawyer who
jointly represents the individual and the class has a conflict of interest.
Presumably, it is precisely because a defendant thinks that settling the
class representative’s individual claim will prejudice the class or putative
class that the defendant is seeking the individual settlement. The
defendant would likely not be willing to settle with the individual if the
class action would continue uninterrupted with the quick substitution of
another party that would serve equally well as lead plaintiff. But if a
settlement is in the individual client’s interest, the lawyer cannot pursue
it or encourage it without thereby betraying the class. Conversely, if class
counsel promotes the best interests of the class as a whole—as courts and
commentators suggest—the lawyer will betray the individual client by
discouraging or impeding the individual settlement. Even if the lawyer
honestly believes that the settlement is not in the individual’s interest, the
lawyer cannot be certain that this assessment is objective, unaffected by
the interests of the class. The conflict makes it ethically perilous to advise
the individual client what to do or to negotiate with the defendant on the
individual’s behalf.
112. Individual settlement should not affect class claims as a formal legal matter. See
Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 568 U.S. 588, 593 (2013) (“[A] plaintiff who files a proposed
class action cannot legally bind members of the proposed class before the class is certified.”);
Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 315 (2011) (“Neither a proposed class action nor a rejected
class action may bind nonparties.”). An individual settlement does not have a preclusive effect on
class claims, see Mars Steel, 834 F.2d at 681, and tolling should generally be available to extend
the statutes of limitations on class claims, see, e.g., In re WorldCom Sec. Litig., 496 F.3d 245,
256 (2d Cir. 2007).
113. See, e.g., Munoz v. Ariz. State Univ., 80 F.R.D. 670, 672 (D. Ariz. 1978) (accusing the
putative class representative and class counsel of attempting to sell out the class to leverage a
higher individual settlement).
114. See Robert D. Phillips Jr. & Samuel J. Park, Ethical Issues in Class Action Settlements,
in 1 A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO CLASS ACTIONS 941, 967 (Marcy Hogan Greer ed., 2017)
(explaining that “settling a putative class action on an individual basis with the named plaintiffs”
is a “tactical” approach that “often make[s] sense from a defense perspective, as settling with the
named plaintiffs is less costly than settling with the entire class and doing so may derail the class
action”).
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Even if the plaintiff does not initiate an individual settlement, a
defendant may seek to “pick off” the named plaintiff by offering an
individual settlement, perhaps for as much or more than the full amount
claimed.115 If the class member is primarily driven by financial selfinterest, the proposed settlement will be attractive: the party’s claim will
be fully satisfied without further delay, and the party avoids the further
time and expense of representing the class. Presumably, class counsel
previously explained the role of the class representative and sought some
assurance that the client would stay the course, but nothing binds the
client to earlier assurances. At that point, the client might turn to class
counsel for advice on whether to accept the offer or continue to serve in
the fiduciary role as named plaintiff. Again, this creates a conflict from
the perspective of both clients: the class member and the class. From the
named plaintiff’s perspective, there is a risk that the lawyer will not
render disinterested advice; out of loyalty to the class, the lawyer may
discourage a settlement that is in the client’s best interest. From the
class’s perspective, the risk is that the lawyer will act disloyally; the
lawyer may encourage the individual client to accept the offer when
doing so would harm the class.
As this example reflects, the conflict may be outside class counsel’s
control and unavoidable; even if the class representative is initially
disinclined to act opportunistically, once the defendant makes a
settlement offer to the class representative individually, the lawyer must
convey it.116 Ordinarily, the lawyer must also advise the class
representative about the offer’s relative merits. The lawyer cannot simply
convey the offer and say nothing further, depriving the client of advice
altogether.117 But the lawyer also cannot give disinterested advice.
Any response to the conflict is costly. First, the lawyer might seek the
court’s permission to withdraw from representing the class. If the court
approves, co-counsel from other law firms, if available, may pick up the
slack. If none are available, the lawyer’s withdrawal would impede, if not
entirely derail, the class action lawsuit. This may harm the individual as
115. Chen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 819 F.3d 1136, 1147 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Deposit Guar.
Nat’l Bank of Jackson v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980)). For an example of a pick-off attempt,
see Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016).
116. See cases cited supra note 108.
117. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (“A lawyer shall
provide competent representation to a client.”); id. at r. 1.2(a) (“[A] lawyer shall abide by a client's
decisions concerning the objectives of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult
with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. . . . A lawyer shall abide by a
client's decision whether to settle a matter.”); id. at r. 1.4(a) (“A lawyer shall: (1) promptly inform
the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client's informed
consent . . . is required by these Rules . . . .”).
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well as the class, since an individual settlement might collapse. Further,
if the lawyer must withdraw before advising the individual client and
commencing negotiations, the individual may lose the leverage that the
class action afforded.
Second, the lawyer might stop representing the class representative
individually. But the individual client might then feel betrayed and be
disadvantaged by having to retain a new lawyer who is unfamiliar with
the case and with whom the individual has no prior relationship. Further,
the delay caused by the substitution of counsel may impede the ability to
conclude a favorable individual settlement. And the time and expense
may prove to be for naught if no individual deal is made.
Third, class counsel might limit the scope of the representation of the
individual class representative by carving out assistance regarding a
possible settlement.118 Class representatives in this scenario might be
required either to negotiate with the defendant on their own or to retain
or rely on other lawyers to assist them. Institutional clients, for example,
might employ in-house counsel or other outside counsel with whom they
already have a relationship. In that event, however, the client would lose
the benefit of the lawyer who is most familiar with the lawsuit and who
may have had sustained dealings with opposing counsel.
Finally, class counsel might attempt to limit the scope of the
representation of the class so that in negotiating on behalf of the
individual, the lawyer will owe no loyalty duty to the class. This is, of
course, another way of saying that the lawyer will be free to be disloyal
to the class and to serve the individual’s interests at the class’s expense.
One might justify this limitation on the theory that, as a legal abstraction,
the class will not perceive that it is being betrayed and its trust in the
lawyer will not diminish as a consequence. But the class may suffer
concretely as well. For example, by forgoing counsel’s loyalty during
negotiations with the defendant, the class may be giving up the
opportunity to negotiate a favorable class settlement. Needless to say, a
lawyer could not unilaterally limit the representation of the class. 119 The
FRCP would seem to prohibit this approach.120 But a lawyer might seek
a court’s authorization to proceed in this manner.121
118. See id. at r. 1.2(c) (“A lawyer may limit the scope of the representation if the limitation
is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent.”).
119. Id. (requiring the client’s consent before counsel may limit the scope of representation).
120. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(4) (“Class counsel must fairly and adequately represent the
interests of the class.”).
121. Although the ABA Model Rules permit lawyers to limit the scope of representation only
with the client’s consent, see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018),
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This conflict between the named representative’s interest in
negotiating an individual settlement and the class’s interests arguably
exists at any point in the representation when an individual settlement is
a plausible option that the individual client might be open to pursuing,
even if neither the defendant nor the class representative proposes such a
settlement. A lawyer has a duty to discuss the possibility of settlement
with a client in a lawsuit.122 Even if the client at the outset had no interest
in pursuing an individual settlement, under the ABA Model Rules
approach, the lawyer could not make it a condition of the retention that
the client would not have a change of heart any more than a criminal
defense lawyer can demand that the accused promise not to plead guilty;
the decision whether to settle a dispute belongs irrevocably to the
client.123 Retainer agreements suggest, however, that some lawyers try to
bar clients who become putative class representatives from settling
individually.124 Other retainer agreements require putative class
representatives to agree to be dropped as clients if a conflict arises with
another client125—a clause that might be invoked if the client wanted to
accept an individual settlement over the objection of the class counsel.
Notwithstanding these attempts to contract around the rules, a lawyer for
individual class members may have an obligation to raise the possibility
of an individual settlement. At each such point, if the lawyer also
represents the class, the lawyer will have a conflict of interest.
C. Payouts
The possibility of payouts is a third recurring situation where conflicts
arise between the interests of the class and a class representative who also
has an individual attorney–client relationship with class counsel. With
courts have sometimes shied away from the strict application of the ABA Model Rules in the class
action setting, see supra note 83 and accompanying text.
122. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (“[A] lawyer
who receives from opposing counsel an offer of settlement in a civil controversy . . . must
promptly inform the client of its substance unless the client has previously indicated that the
proposal will be acceptable or unacceptable or has authorized the lawyer to accept or to reject the
offer.”).
123. See id. at r. 1.2(a).
124. See, e.g., Retainer Agreement – Class Action, supra note 1 (“Client understands that it
cannot settle a class action lawsuit without protecting the interests of the other class members.”).
125. See, e.g., Letter from Frank E. Marchetti to Christine Anderson at 4, Anderson v. PODS
of L.A., LLC, No. 2:13-cv-04893 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2013), ECF No. 16-1 (“You also understand
that Attorney will not be able to represent you if Attorney’s representation of you would create a
conflict with one of the Attorney’s existing clients. . . . You expressly agree to immediately
consent to Attorney substituting out as your attorney of record after a lawsuit is filed if Attorney
learns through discovery of such a conflict.”).
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some frequency, class representatives seek or are promised by counsel a
unique amount of monetary compensation, greater than what other class
members will receive, often in conflict with the class’s interests.126 Socalled incentive awards to class representatives are common 127 and are
typically determined following a settlement.128 There is nothing
inherently wrong with such payouts when they are negotiated after
settlement—except in securities class actions where a statute has altered
the law.129 But the case reports are full of examples of class
representatives and class counsel negotiating an individual windfall
payout to the representative before a settlement is approved, sometimes
as a condition of the class representative supporting the settlement.130
The most abusive form of these deals involves significant benefits to
both class representatives and class counsel, and little or nothing of value
for the class. In one case, a disability discrimination class action was
settled against the owner of gasoline service stations with a $5,000
payment to the named plaintiff, $50,000 in attorney’s fees, injunctive
relief that simply required the corporation to “meet its legal obligations
(or perhaps even less than that required) under the [Americans with
Disabilities Act131],” and a very broad release of the absent class
members’ statutory damages claims.132 Another example is a settlement
of a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act133 class suit that provided for
$2,000 to the named plaintiff, a small donation to a law school clinic,
$78,000 in attorney’s fees, and a release that left absent class members
126. See 5 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, § 17:1.
127. Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 958–59 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Such awards are
discretionary and are intended to compensate class representatives for work done on behalf of the
class, to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the action, and,
sometimes, to recognize their willingness to act as a private attorney general.” (citation omitted));
see also Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs:
An Empirical Study, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1316 (2006) (“If incentive awards are being used in
this fashion, we expect that incentive awards will be more common and larger when attorneys’
fees are lower . . . .”).
128. Rodriguez, 563 F.3d at 959.
129. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(a)(2)(A)(vi) (2018) (requiring a putative lead plaintiff in a
securities class action to file with the court a sworn certification that “the plaintiff will not accept
any payment for serving as a representative party on behalf of a class beyond the plaintiff’s pro
rata share of any recovery, except as ordered or approved by the court”).
130. See 5 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, § 17:17 (citing Rodriguez, 563 F.3d 948).
131. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C. (2018) and at 47 U.S.C. § 225 (2012)).
132. Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 942, 953–54 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled by Dukes v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 617 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
133. Pub. L. No. 90-321, 91 Stat. 874 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1692
(2018)).
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able to bring their own individual damages suits but not a subsequent
class action.134 Both settlements were approved by the district courts but
reversed on appeal as unfair to the classes.135
Defendants are happy to make deals like this if they can secure
approval of class counsel and the courts. The ready possibility of securing
deals that sell out the absent class members to benefit the class
representative and class counsel puts class counsel in an inherently
conflicted position. District and appellate courts do reject some of these
settlements as unfair to the class.136 As a result, a lawyer for the class and
class representative individually might argue that she has no duty to
counsel the individual client about the possibility of a deal, and therefore
no conflict exists between the lawyer’s duties to the class and the class
representative individually. However, because not all of these deals are
rejected, the conflict remains.
To see why, consider the case of incentive payments to class
representatives negotiated prior to settlement with the settlement also
giving real benefits to the absent class members. For example, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently considered a settlement
in a Fair Credit Reporting Act137 case against credit rating agencies that
issued credit reports that continued to list debts as delinquent despite
having been discharged in bankruptcy.138 Absent class members received
some value from the settlement.139 An injunction required the three
defendants, which dominate the credit reporting market, to “presume the
discharge of certain pre-bankruptcy debts” going forward.140 Class
members who could prove that a negative credit report contributed to the
denial of employment got $750; class members who could prove denials
of a mortgage or housing rental received $500, and those that could prove
denials of consumer credit or auto loans received $150.141 Conversely,
class members who could not prove actual damages received about $26
as “convenience awards.”142 Class representatives, however, were

134.
135.
136.
137.
(2018)).
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Crawford v. Equifax Payment Servs., Inc., 201 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir. 2000).
See Molski, 318 F.3d at 941–42; Crawford, 201 F.3d at 882.
See Molski, 318 F.3d at 942; Crawford, 201 F.3d at 882.
Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1128 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681
See Radcliffe v. Experian Info. Sols. Inc., 715 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2013).
See id. at 1162.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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promised $5,000 each—far more than absent class members—on the
express condition that they support the settlement.143
This was a conflict from both the individual client’s perspective and
the class’s perspective. The lawyer could not negotiate on behalf of both
the individual class member and the class. Helping the class
representatives to a better deal hurt the class by depriving it of the class
representatives’ fiduciary role in protecting absent class members and by
directing money away from absent class members into the pockets of the
representatives. It is considered axiomatic in class action literature that
defendants care only about the total dollar value of a settlement, but not
about how the dollars are divided between class counsel, class
representatives, and absent class members.144 Choices by class
representatives and class counsel about allocating settlement money are
zero-sum and hence necessarily put counsel in a conflicted position when
counsel simultaneously owes duties to both the class and the class
representatives.
III. WHEN DOES CLASS COUNSEL’S CONFLICT OF INTEREST FIRST
BEGIN?
As described in Part II, lawyers who jointly represent a class and its
individual class representative will have a conflict of interest at least at
the point when the class representative opposes a favorable settlement of
the class action, seeks a favorable individual settlement that will
prejudice absent class members, or seeks an incentive payment or other
individual benefit from the settlement of the class action that exceeds the
benefits afforded to absent class members. At these moments, the
conflicting interests of the class and the individual client make it difficult,
or even impossible, for the lawyer to serve both clients competently and
loyally. One might say that the lawyer’s conflict of interest is now
manifest, patent, real, or actual.145
One question this raises is, when should lawyers in class actions first
address the problem of their clients’ differing interests? May lawyers wait
143. Id. at 1164–65.
144. See Eubank v. Pella Corp., 753 F.3d 718, 720 (7th Cir. 2014) (“The defendant cares
only about the size of the settlement, not how it is divided between attorneys’ fees and
compensation for the class.”).
145. These are all terms used to convey that the problem actually now exists—it is not
conjectural or in the future. Cf. 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, § 3.58 (“Conflicts that are
merely speculative or hypothetical will not affect the [class representative] adequacy inquiry. A
conflict must be manifest at the time of certification rather than dependent on some future event
or turn in the litigation that might never occur.” (footnote omitted)).
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to see whether the conflict becomes manifest, as may occur in only a
fraction of class actions, or does the risk of a later manifest conflict of
interest require the court and lawyer to address the problem at the
certification stage, or even earlier? This is an important question that
judicial decisions and other writings overlook, resulting in lawyers’
freedom to ignore conflicts of interest until they compromise the
representation (and, in some cases, even then).146 Once litigation is well
advanced, lawyers, courts, and clients often feel significant pressure to
stay the course, even if the conflict is a serious one.147 This Part addresses
these questions of timing from the perspective of two points in time.
First, section A focuses on the class certification stage. It discusses
how professional conduct rules governing conflicts of interest deal with
what might be described as “nascent conflicts” or potential conflicts
among joint clients—that is, the situation early in the representation when
the joint clients’ conflicting interests have not yet put the lawyer in a bind,
but when a lawyer can nevertheless envision the possibility that a conflict
may become manifest as the representation unfolds.148 Section B then
looks at the earlier moment in time when the lawyer files a class action
complaint on behalf of a putative class representative whom the lawyer
also represents individually. It considers whether a lawyer filing a class
action lawsuit must address the nascent conflict at the outset, even before
the lawyer formally represents the class, because the lawyer’s fiduciary
duties to the nascent class give rise to a conflict of interest from the
perspective of the individual client, the absent class members, or both.149
Although neither the absent class members nor the class itself are clients
as a legal matter, and therefore the lawyer is not engaged in a joint
146. Courts are more concerned with the lawyer’s self-interest than with the conflicting
interests of the class and the class representatives. See, e.g., Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, Inc., 74
F.R.D. 61, 72 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (“[I]t is a reality of class action life that the potential for such
abuse lies chiefly in the hands of plaintiff's counsel who, as a negotiator, unfortunately must
represent three distinct and inherently conflicting interests: the named plaintiff's, the asserted class
members’ and his own.”).
147. See Andrew J. Wistrich & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, How Lawyers’ Intuitions Prolong
Litigation, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 571, 616 (2013) (discussing how the sunk cost fallacy can affect
litigation).
148. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, “Through a Glass Darkly”: How the Court Sees Motions to
Disqualify Criminal Defense Lawyers, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1201, 1211–12 (1989) (distinguishing
“an actual or nascent conflict”). More often, particularly in the criminal context, the literature
distinguishes between “actual” and “potential” conflicts. See, e.g., Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S.
162, 165 (2002) (quoting Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d 348, 355–56 (4th Cir. 2001)).
149. The term “nascent class” is used occasionally in caselaw, see, e.g., In re Mid-Atlantic
Toyota Antitrust Litig., 564 F. Supp. 1379, 1389 (D. Md. 1983), but the term “putative class” is
far more commonly used to describe the class before it is certified.
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representation of clients with conflicting interests, the Advisory
Committee Notes to the 2003 amendments to FRCP Rule 23, among
others, hold that, after filing a class action, the lawyer owes duties to the
absent class members or to the nascent or putative class.150 If so, the
lawyer’s conflicting duties, if not a conflicting representation, may
compromise a lawyer’s representation of the individual; and the lawyer’s
duties to the individual client may compromise the lawyer’s ability to act
for the nascent class’s benefit.
A. Nascent Conflicts: The Class Certification Stage
Under the ABA Model Rules, in the situations described in Part II, the
lawyer would likely have a conflict of interest at the outset of the joint
representation.151 That is true even if no one anticipates that class
representatives will necessarily act in their own interests as distinct from
those of the class. Their interests differ now, and there is a risk that later,
the conflicting interests will have implications for the lawyer’s work.
Conflict-of-interest rules regulate the risk that trouble will arise later,
even if joint clients are harmonious at the start.
The threshold question in representing joint clients, such as a class
and a class representative, is whether there is a “significant risk” that the
lawyer’s representation of one will be materially limited by the lawyer’s
duties to the other.152 This calls for the lawyer to make a prediction in
light of the respective clients’ interests, the nature of the representation,
and the lawyer’s experience, among other considerations.153 Further, this
judgment must be made against the background of professional writing,
including judicial decisions and bar association opinions, that have
applied and given meaning to the conflict rule in the past. A joint
representation of parties to a lawsuit is frequently a conflict of interest
because the co-clients often have differing interests and, given the nature
of litigation, the risk is often “significant” (as opposed to “insignificant”)
150. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
151. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (stating that
a conflict of interest exists if “there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more
clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client
or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer” (emphasis added)).
152. Id.
153. See id. at r. 1.7 cmt. 8 (“The mere possibility of subsequent harm does not itself require
disclosure and consent. The critical questions are the likelihood that a difference in interests will
eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer’s independent
professional judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably
should be pursued on behalf of the client.”).
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that, at some point, as the litigation progresses, the lawyer’s duties to one
will compromise the lawyer’s representation of the other.154
If class counsel intends to represent class representatives individually
after the class is certified, the joint representation almost certainly will
constitute a conflict. There will be a “significant risk” that, at some later
point, unless the lawyer withdraws from one of the representations or
limits its scope, the lawyer’s duties to the class will compromise the
lawyer’s representation of the class representative, or vice versa.155 The
question is whether, under the conflict rules, the lawyer may undertake
or continue the joint representation despite this risk. The ABA Model
Rules are somewhat paternalistic: they forbid the joint representation
even with the respective clients’ informed consent unless lawyers
reasonably believe that they can represent each client competently and
diligently despite the conflict.156 But the authorities interpreting and
applying the rules ordinarily allow joint clients whose interests are
generally aligned to assume the risk that, down the road, there will be a
parting of the ways.157 In that event, the lawyer may represent both with
the respective clients’ “informed consent.”158
The takeaway is that lawyers jointly representing a class
representative and the class cannot blithely ignore the risks until a conflict
of interest manifests itself. They must assess the likelihood that the class
representatives will try to benefit at the class’s expense. If that is the class
representatives’ objective from the outset, the joint representation is
likely improper because the risk that the clients will be competing with
each other will be too high. In that event, the lawyer might seek to be
appointed as class counsel but drop the individual client, or the lawyer
might continue representing the individual and try to identify another
lawyer to be appointed to serve as class counsel—but the lawyer cannot
do both. Caselaw suggests that class counsel in such a position is not
supposed to make these decisions privately.159 Counsel must call
conflicts and potential conflicts to the district court’s attention, and must
154. See N.Y. St. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2017-7 n.3 (“Joint
representation of multiple parties to a litigation . . . often involves a conflict of interest because
there is a significant risk that the clients will differ as to, for example, litigation strategy or
cooperation and resolution.”).
155. Cf. Stuhan & Costello, supra note 14, at 1200 (“[T]he stakes are typically too high . . . in
class actions . . . to wait until a conflict becomes manifest and obvious.”).
156. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
157. See id. at r. 1.7 cmts. 29, 33.
158. Id. at r. 1.7(b)(4).
159. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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seek the court’s direction for how to resolve the conflict.160 One reason is
that the ABA Model Rules’ requirement that each affected client give
informed consent when joint representations involve conflicts of
interest161 cannot practically apply to absent class members, who can
number in the thousands in many class actions.162
B. Nascent Classes: The Beginning of the Lawsuit
Whether a lawyer who files a class action has a conflict of interest
even before the class is certified is a difficult question because of the
uncertainty regarding the lawyer’s duties (if any) to the nascent class.
Until the class is certified, the class does not exist as a legal entity;
therefore, the lawyer would seem to have only one client: the prospective
class representative who is the plaintiff in the lawsuit.163 But it is
conceivable that the lawyer nevertheless owes duties to absent putative
class members, or to the nascent class, that limit the lawyer’s ordinary
zeal on behalf of the individual. As noted, the Advisory Committee Notes
to the 2003 amendments to FRCP Rule 23, and others, conclude that after
filing a class action and before class certification, the lawyer owes a duty
to act in the best interest of the absent putative class members or to the
nascent or putative class.164 Some courts have apparently gone further,
stating that lawyers who file a class action lawsuit have fiduciary duties
to the absent class members too.165 But these decisions have not
160. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
161. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b)(4) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018); see also id.
at r. 1.4(a)(1) (requiring that a lawyer “promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance
with respect to which the client’s informed consent . . . is required”); id. at r. 1.4(b) (providing
that a lawyer must “explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to
make informed decisions regarding the representation”).
162. See LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW
465 (3d ed. 2012) (“It is not practicable to sit down with each member of a large class to explain
possible conflicts and obtain meaningful informed consent.”); Cooper, supra note 55, at 39
(“Counsel for the class seldom is in a position to consult with each class member to determine
individual interests and needs, or to measure and reconcile the conflicts among individual interests
and needs.”). Class counsel must, however, explain the implications of the joint representation—
the benefits, risks, and alternatives—and secure the informed consent of class representatives who
are also individual clients. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.0(e) (Am. Bar Ass’n 2018).
163. Stuhan & Costello, supra note 14, at 1205 & n.43 (“[U]ntil a class is certified, there is
no formal attorney–client relationship between the putative class and putative class counsel.”).
164. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
165. See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d
768, 801 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[C]lass attorneys, purporting to represent a class, also owe the entire
class a fiduciary duty once the class complaint is filed.”); Fleury v. Richemont N. Am., Inc., No.
C-05-4525 EMC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64521, *44 (N.D. Cal. July 3, 2008); see also Nick
Landsman-Roos, Note, Front-End Fiduciaries: Precertification Duties and Class Conflict, 65
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elaborated on the nature and extent of those duties or explained how a
lawyer should address the tension between the individual client’s
interests and conflicting duties to the putative class. In general, at the precertification stage, the conflict with which courts are concerned does not
involve the competing interests of the class and class representatives but
rather the risk that the lawyers will give primacy to their own legal fees.166
There is no definitive statement to be found about duties to a nascent class
in either FRCP Rule 23, its caselaw, or the ABA Model Rules.
That neither the nascent class nor the absent class members are a client
at this stage does not mean that the lawyer cannot owe them duties once
the class action is filed. There is nothing anomalous about owing duties
to a non-client. Lawyers may assume a duty of competence to third
parties for whom (in the course of representing a client) they prepare an
opinion letter;167 they may also assume a competence duty to a client’s
beneficiaries.168 Nor is it unprecedented for lawyers to owe duties to
“nascent” clients. Some authorities recognize, for example, that lawyers
representing clients in forming a corporation may assume duties to the
yet-to-be-formed corporation.169
In these examples, however, the lawyer undertakes duties to third
parties by express or implied agreement either with the lawyer’s client or
with the third parties themselves. When a lawyer assumes duties to an
unformed corporation, it is because the lawyer has agreed to do so with
the individual clients who retained the lawyer to establish the corporation.
When a lawyer undertakes duties to a third party for whom the lawyer
STAN. L. REV. 817, 838 (2013) (“While there is agreement that counsel owes a fiduciary duty to
a certified class, the existence of such a relationship in the precertification stage is far from clear.
The majority view is that before class certification, the putative class members are not
‘represented’ by class counsel and thus are not owed a fiduciary duty. Yet a number of courts
have held that, even in the absence of class certification, class counsel owes a fiduciary duty to
unnamed class members in the precertification period. Regardless of the position taken, these
decisions are largely bereft of reasoning.” (footnotes omitted)).
166. See, e.g., In re Nazi Era Cases Against German Defendants Litig., 198 F.R.D. 429, 439
(D.N.J. 2000).
167. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51(2); cf. MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (imposing and describing a duty of
competence upon lawyers with respect to clients).
168. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51(3).
169. See, e.g., Jesse v. Danforth, 485 N.W.2d 63, 67 (Wis. 1992) (explaining that where a
lawyer represents a person for the purpose of incorporating an entity, following the incorporation
the lawyer’s earlier representation will be “deemed to be representation of the entity, not the
person”); St. Bar of Az., Formal Ethics Op. 02-06 (2002) (“[A] lawyer may represent an entity
during the formation process, as long as the constituents who are acting on behalf of the yet-tobe-formed entity understand and agree to the entity being the client.”).
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prepares an opinion letter, it is because the lawyer agreed with the third
party to do so. A third party is not necessarily entitled to rely on opinion
letters prepared by lawyers exclusively for the lawyers’ clients. 170 But if
the lawyer agrees to provide an opinion to a prospective buyer or agrees
that the prospective buyer may receive and rely on the lawyer’s opinion,
the lawyer undertakes a duty of competence to that non-client.171
In contrast, it is implausible that a lawyer who files a class action
complaint on behalf of an individual seeking to serve as class
representative thereby agrees with (1) absent class members; (2) the
individual client; or (3) the nascent class, to serve absent class members,
or the nascent class, competently or loyally. The filing plainly is not
preceded by an agreement between the lawyer and the absent class
members: the lawyer may have no interaction at all with absent class
members, who, for their part, may be unaware of the lawsuit. Nor does
the filing necessarily connote the lawyer’s agreement with the individual
client to serve absent class members as beneficiaries. As the caselaw
reflects, the individual class members may opt to exploit the class action
in various ways for their own benefit.172 Whether the individuals direct
the lawyer to act partly or solely in the interests of absent class members
is up to them. And, of course, the lawyer has not agreed with the nascent,
legally nonexistent class.
If the lawyer assumes duties to the nascent class, it cannot be by virtue
of agreement, but only by operation of law. The law can impose duties
on lawyers beyond those to which lawyers agree. For example, rules of
professional conduct require lawyers to assume a host of duties to the
court that may restrict lawyers’ ability to advance clients’ interests.173
Lawyers assume confidentiality duties to prospective clients regardless
of whether they agree to do so.174 And, indeed, the duties that lawyers
owe to clients are largely established by professional conduct rules and
agency law, not by contract.

170. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 cmt. e (“A lawyer
may avoid liability to nonclients . . . by making clear that an opinion or representation is directed
only to a client and should not be relied on by others.”).
171. See id. (noting that a lawyer owes a duty of care to a nonclient whom the lawyer invites
to rely on the lawyer’s opinion, if the nonclient reasonably does so).
172. See supra notes 113–114 and accompanying text.
173. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (“If a
lawyer, the lawyer’s client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence and
the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures,
including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.”).
174. See id. at r. 1.18(b).
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For reasons others have identified, courts should declare, as some
have, that lawyers filing class actions assume fiduciary duties to absent
class members or to the nascent class. Substantial work is typically
performed prior to class certification with the court’s expectation that the
lawyer is acting for the class’s benefit. Recognizing this, FRCP Rule 23
was amended in 2003 to allow for the appointment of “interim” class
counsel prior to adjudication of a certification motion.175 As the Advisory
Committee Notes discuss, whether or not counsel is formally designated
as “interim,” “[b]efore class certification . . . it will usually be important
for an attorney to take action to prepare for the certification decision,”
such as engaging in discovery relevant to certification, making or
responding to other motions, and perhaps discussing settlement.176
If one concludes, as a matter of law, that the named plaintiff’s lawyer
in a pre-certification class action must act in the best interests of the
nascent class, even if it is not a client in a legal sense, the question then
becomes, what are the scope and limits of the lawyer’s duties to the
nascent class? On this question, the law is not only unhelpful but also
conflicting. In the context of individuals’ settlements, courts have
relatively low expectations of the lawyers.177 But in the context of precertification class settlements, courts have high expectations.178 A lawyer
who simultaneously explores both individual and class settlements
cannot give primacy to both the individual’s interests and the class’s
interests.
At least in negotiating a settlement on behalf of a class representative
individually, it might be argued that the lawyer’s fiduciary duty is, at
most, to avoid affirmatively prejudicing absent class members.179 Prior to
the 2003 amendment to FRCP Rule 23, courts debated whether court
approval was required when the class representative proposed to settle
individually and dismiss the class action.180 Courts expressed concern
175. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(3).
176. Id. at 23 advisory committee’s note to 2003 amendment.
177. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
178. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619–20 (1997) (stating that
proposals to jointly certify and settle a class action require the courts to utilize a “close” and
“heightened” scrutiny as to whether the requirements of FRCP Rule 23 have been met).
179. See Landsman-Roos, supra note 165, at 842 (“[T]he scope of those duties is limited to
protecting the substantive legal rights of putative class members that form the basis of the class
action suit from prejudice.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Schick v. Berg, No. 03 Civ. 5513(LBS),
2004 WL 856298, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2004), aff’d, 430 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2005)).
180. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 2003 amendment (“Rule
23(e)(1)(A) resolves the ambiguity in former Rule 23(e)’s reference to dismissal or compromise
of ‘a class action.’ That language could be⎯and at times was⎯read to require court approval of
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with settlements that used the threat of a class action to benefit the
individual claimant, to the possible disadvantage of the absent class
members.181 Even if absent class members were not legally bound by the
settlement, they might have relied to their detriment on the assumption
that the class action would be litigated. They may have decided to await
the outcome of the lawsuit rather than to take other available measures,
such as filing an individual action, filing their own class action, or
competing to serve as class representative and proposing a different
lawyer to serve as class counsel. Courts took various approaches to the
problem of individual settlements, with most concluding that notice to
absent class members and judicial review were necessary if there was a
risk that absent class members would be prejudiced.182 FRCP Rule 23(e)
now requires notice and court approval only if class members would be
bound by the proposed settlement, which is not ordinarily the case if the
defendant compensates the named plaintiff for dismissing the lawsuit
before the class is certified.183 One might infer that the lawyer’s duty to
the nascent class, if any, is simply to avoid absent class members’
detrimental reliance on the lawsuit.
The court will expect more from class counsel, however, if the lawyer
negotiated a settlement for the class during the pre-certification stage and
then asked the court to both certify the class and approve the
settlement.184 At that point, the court’s responsibility is to assure that, in
negotiating the settlement, the lawyer acted in the best interest of the
class, not the named plaintiff.185 Looking backward in time, this suggests
settlements with putative class representatives that resolved only individual claims.”).
181. See, e.g., Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 61, 66–67 (S.D. Tex. 1977)
(“[T]he possibility of ‘legalized blackmail’ and Rule 23 abuse is at its height during the precertification stage when defendant is literally threatened by potential class-wide liability. Because
the existence of a class has not been determined, the likelihood increases that plaintiff and his
counsel will unduly sacrifice the previously-asserted class interest for private gain.” (citation
omitted) (quoting William Simon, Class Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D.
375, 389 (1973))).
182. See, e.g., Schemmer v. Chartone, Inc., No. 1:05CV2923, 2008 WL 1929980, at *1 (N.D.
Ohio Apr. 29, 2008); Anderberg v. Masonite Corp., 176 F.R.D. 682, 689 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
183. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
184. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619–20 (1997) (stating that
proposals to jointly certify and settle a class action require the courts to utilize a “close” and
“heightened” scrutiny as to whether the requirements of FRCP Rule 23 have been met).
185. See In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768,
784–85 (3d Cir. 1995); In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig. (Agent Orange), 800 F.2d 14, 18
(2d Cir. 1986); Munoz v. Ariz. State Univ., 80 F.R.D. 670, 672 (D. Ariz. 1978); cf. Reynolds v.
Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The principal issue presented by these
appeals is whether the district judge discharged the judicial duty to protect the members of a class
in class action litigation from lawyers for the class who may, in derogation of their professional
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that the court will expect the lawyer to have treated the nascent class as a
client during the negotiation stage and, indeed, as between the nascent
class and the class representative, to have given primacy to the nascent
class’s interests. The lawyer may regard loyalty to the nascent class as a
fiduciary duty to the nascent class, as an element of competent
representation of the individual who brought the class action, or simply
as a procedural obligation implicit in FRCP Rule 23.
The ideas that lawyers, in the pre-certification stage, may seek to
advance the individual’s interests in disregard of the absent class
members, but at the same time must give primacy to the class’s interests
with virtual disregard of the individual client’s interests, seem hard to
reconcile. But one possible explanation is that the duties owed to the
nascent class are not static and unchangeable; rather, they may evolve as
the class action progresses (e.g., as absent class members’ reliance grows)
or differ depending on the task being performed.186
Of course, a distinction between the lawyer’s duties pre- or postappointment as interim lead counsel, or as counsel to a certified class, is
artificial.187 The class is a legal construct that could be constructed at
earlier or later points in the lawsuit. Jean Wegman Burns has proposed,
for example, that class counsel should be required to represent the class
from the time a class action is filed, and that class representatives should
be replaced with another mechanism for monitoring class counsel.188 At
that point, the conflict-of-interest problem would have a straightforward
solution: barring class counsel from representing individual class
members. Even under the current regime, it is unclear why certification
should be the dividing line. Absent class members’ reliance interests, or
other interests, may not change significantly simply because the class is
and fiduciary obligations, place their pecuniary self-interest ahead of that of the class. This
problem, repeatedly remarked by judges and scholars requires district judges to exercise the
highest degree of vigilance in scrutinizing proposed settlements of class actions.” (citations
omitted)).
186. See Larkin Gen. Hosp., Ltd. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 93 F.R.D. 497, 501–02 (E.D. Pa.
1982). One might also consider whether the lawyer’s duties expand if the lawyer is appointed to
serve as “interim [class] counsel” under FRCP Rule 23(g)(3). FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(3). FRCP Rule
23(g)(4) calls on class counsel to “fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class,” and
this arguably applies to interim class counsel as well. Id. at 23(g)(4).
187. Landsman-Roos, supra note 165, at 840 (“[I]mposing different pre- and postcertification fiduciary duties is an artificial, counterintuitive distinction. Nothing changes in terms
of an absent class member’s reliance on an attorney before and after certification. Likewise, the
level of control an attorney has over an absent class member’s relevant asset—that is, his claim—
remains the same pre- and postcertification.”).
188. Jean Wegman Burns, Decorative Figureheads: Eliminating Class Representatives in
Class Actions, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 165, 200–01 (1990).
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certified. Likewise, it seems odd to think that the lawyer’s loyalty to the
class in negotiating a class settlement, and therefore the lawyer’s
approach to the negotiations, should differ depending on whether the
lawyer is negotiating for the nascent class prior to certification or for the
class as a “client” after class certification.
IV. WHAT SHOULD LAWYERS DO?
That the law is unclear, and that courts seem indifferent, does not
relieve lawyers of their ethical duties to individual clients. Class action
law may define or inform the nature and scope of a lawyer’s duties toward
the “class as a whole,”189 absent class members, and class representatives.
But if individuals are represented as individuals, a lawyer must still
comply with their state-adopted version of the ABA Model Rules
governing communications with, and disclosures to, a client—e.g., Rules
1.2(c), 1.4 and 1.7, among others. Lawyers need to explain both how they
propose to act in light of the legal uncertainty and how the uncertainty
may add to the risks. Therefore, lawyers must take a position in light of
the jurisdiction’s law regarding their pre- and post-certification duties.
Lawyers should explain the ground rules of the class action to their
individual clients and talk through important issues and questions that
may arise. Will the lawyer’s advocacy on behalf of the individual be
limited by legal duties to the class or the lawyer’s own financial (and
perhaps reputational) interest in seeing the class certified? Is there a risk
that the lawyer’s advice will be untrustworthy because the lawyer will be
taking account of the class’s interests? Is there a risk that the lawyer will
have to withdraw from representing the individual to continue the class
representation? Is there a risk that, if a class is not certified, the lawyer
will seek to drop the individual client because the matter is no longer
likely to be substantially remunerative? These should be substantial,
detailed communications.190
Lawyers should, at the outset of the representation, inform their
individual clients of rights that the pressures and incentives of concurrent
class litigation might lead the lawyer to later downgrade or ignore. For
example, an individual client might be informed of her absolute right to
seek a settlement at any time and to approve or disapprove any settlement
offer. An individual client might also usefully be informed of the right to

189. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 2003 amendment.
190. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L Conduct r. 1.4(b) (“A lawyer shall explain a matter to the
extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation.”).
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have her attorney keep her reasonably informed of the status of the matter
and to fully inform her about potential conflicts.
One cannot eavesdrop on privileged communications between class
action lawyers and individual clients to know whether these kinds of
communications occur. The sense that they rarely do is based on a dearth
of caselaw or professional literature recommending or mandating such
communications, and the fact that almost all of the retainer agreements
reviewed were brief and vague. If this intuition is correct, then any
communication along the lines proposed would improve on the status
quo.
One approach that some lawyers take seems improper. Some retainer
agreements contemplate an individual representation and a filing for class
certification, and then state that the client waives all future conflicts191 or
agrees to be dropped as a client if any future conflicts arise. 192 Such a
barebones waiver provision is antithetical to the concept of “informed
consent” in the context of conflicts of interest.193 Informed consent
ordinarily requires an explanation of the facts giving rise to a conflict of
interest and an explanation of the risks, benefits, and alternatives.194
Many courts are skeptical of advanced waivers of conflicts of interest,
precisely because the relevant facts creating the risk of conflict are not
yet known.195 At a minimum, for consent to be effective in advance of a
conflict arising, there must be an explanation, at least in general terms, of
the conflict of interest that is anticipated to arise and the implications.
Beyond that, a client cannot be asked to waive all future conflicts without
elaboration because not all are subject to waiver, or consent, under the
professional conduct rules applicable in state and federal proceedings
191. See Class Action Engagement Agreement at 4–5, Gazzara v. Pulte Home Corp., 207 F.
Supp. 3d 1306 (M.D. Fla. 2016) (No. 6:16-cv-657-Ofl-31TBS), ECF No. 161-26 (“[T]he
Attorneys will be separately providing legal representation to you at the same time that they will
be providing legal representation to other owners of homes, townhomes and condominiums
against the builder of your residence . . . . [Y]ou and other owners have each agreed to waive any
conflict of interest arising out of, and that you will not object to, our representation of each other
in the matter described herein.”).
192. See Letter from Frank E. Marchetti to Christine Anderson, Anderson v. PODS of L.A.,
LLC, No. 2:13-cv-04893 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2013), ECF No. 16-1 (“You also understand that
Attorney will not be able to represent you if Attorney’s representation of you would create a
conflict with one of the Attorney’s existing clients. . . . You expressly agree to immediately
consent to Attorney substituting out as your attorney of record after a lawsuit is filed if Attorney
learns through discovery of such a conflict.”).
193. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L Conduct r. 1.7(b)(4) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
194. See id. at r. 1.0(e).
195. See, e.g., Worldspan, L.P. v. Sabre Grp. Holdings, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1359–60
(N.D. Ga. 1998) (finding waiver language too vague).
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based on the ABA Model Rules.196 Therefore, even for a sophisticated
class representative, the pro forma waiver provision will not suffice.
Nor can individual clients be asked to contract in advance that they
will follow their lawyer’s direction about whether to settle. Settlement is
carved out by the ABA Model Rules as a decision that “must . . . be made
by the client.”197 One might say that clients are actually making the
decision if they voluntarily decide in advance to follow the lawyer’s
advice. But that seems to violate the clear purpose of the rule, which is to
preserve individual client autonomy, informed but not controlled by legal
counsel, over the “objectives” of the representation.198 Therefore, it is
likely to be unethical for putative class counsel to ask their individual
clients to agree to delegate the settlement decision, whether in an initial
retainer agreement or later on.
The concerns this Article raises, and the disclosures it suggests, may
be less relevant when the individual client is a sophisticated one, whether
a natural person or an entity, and when the client has other representation,
whether in-house lawyer employees or outside representation. After the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA),199 the individual
client of class counsel in securities litigation is very likely to be a
sophisticated institutional investor with in-house counsel,200 and this type
of class litigation may well raise fewer concerns than other types.
V. WHAT SHOULD RULEMAKERS AND TRIAL COURTS DO?
As this Article shows, a certain kind of conflict is endemic in class
actions and is not being adequately addressed. If courts or other
rulemakers were to pay attention to the conflicts problem arising out of
class counsel’s representation of individual class representatives, a
number of questions would arise. There is the threshold question of
whether new rules, standards, or procedures are needed, or whether
existing law simply needs to be more vigorously or differently applied. If
new guidance is needed, there is the institutional choice question of who
should formulate and who should apply it. Relatedly, rulemakers must
ask what a new legal rule, standard, or procedure should say.

196. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 22 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
197. Id. at r. 1.2(a) cmt. 1 (discussing ABA Model Rule 1.2(a)).
198. Id. at r. 1.2(a).
199. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.).
200. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb) (2018) (mandating a rebuttable presumption
that the most adequate plaintiff in a securities class action be the investor with “the largest
financial interest in the relief sought by the class”).
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As discussed, current law and practice do not appear to understand the
conflict this Article identifies to be a serious one and thus have not offered
solutions. Some change over the status quo is warranted. The previous
Part suggested that class counsel or putative class counsel who also have
an individual attorney–client relationship should consider both making
certain kinds of disclosures to the individual clients to address potential
conflicts and seeking informed consent to waive actual or potential
conflicts. But the class also must be protected, and absent class members
cannot give consent or receive adequate counseling. Because of absent
class members’ typically low knowledge or investment in the class
litigation, district court judges oversee class counsel and, when necessary,
protect absent class members from potential overreaching or
exploitation.201 Simply making class counsel more aware of the conflicts
is not sufficient.
Courts handling class actions are often reluctant to apply the ABA
Model Rules or state counterparts addressing conflicts if they think that
policies of FRCP Rule 23 or the practical imperative to keep moving
litigation to a resolution will be hampered thereby.202 One might ask
whether the conflicts this Article identifies could be appropriately
addressed if federal courts were willing to simply apply ABA Model Rule
1.7 or other conflict rules as written to the representation of classes.203 (In
the previous Part, this Article advocated greater compliance with the
ABA Model Rules approach by class counsel when interacting with their
individual clients.)
It is not easy to dismiss the idea that the standard conflict rules should
govern the propriety of a lawyer’s joint representation of a class and a
class representative, just as they would govern the joint representation of
a corporation and a corporate officer. There would be nothing exceptional
about applying ABA Model Rule 1.7 in this context, other than that the
court’s authorization would have to serve as a substitute for the class’s
informed consent.204 If some other standard should apply, the reason is
simply that class counsel’s conflict is different from the conflicts that
ABA Model Rule 1.7 ordinarily addresses and that courts, in overseeing
class actions, are in a position to develop and enforce a standard that
makes better sense in the class action context.
201. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
203. See generally Kane, supra note 15 (advocating for more effective judicial oversight to
address the possibility that class counsel may favor the class representatives’ interests).
204. See Miller, supra note 14, at 588 (“[R]eview by the court substitutes for client
consent.”).
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On the other hand, conflict rules are written to cover situations where
there are no courts to oversee the lawyers, and may therefore tend to be
more protective and more categorical than courts need to be in class
action litigation, in which there is substantial judicial oversight.205 The
district courts serve as the gatekeeper of four things that plaintiff-side
class action lawyers greatly desire: class certification, appointment as
class counsel, approval of settlements, and approval of fees.206 District
courts, therefore, inherently have the attention of class action lawyers and
have well-defined points during litigation in which they can interact with
and monitor lawyers.
The FRCP, as interpreted by courts, already require class counsel to
provide information to the court about conflicts as relevant to certification
or settlement decisions, and judicial doctrine further requires that even
“potential” conflicts be brought to the court’s attention.207 With this
structure in place for judicial oversight, overly protective and categorical
ethics rules written to be applied by lawyers themselves are arguably
inappropriate.208
If the current ABA Model Rules approach is not the best fit, the
question is then who might craft a better approach, and what that
approach would be. On the question of institutional choice, one
possibility would be for the ABA to develop a set of rules that address
conflicts in class actions specifically, including the type on which this
Article focuses. Another possibility would be for the Rules Enabling Act
process to be used to amend FRCP Rule 23. The federal rulemaking
process is likely to involve greater participation by different
constituencies209 than would be the case with an ABA-controlled process.
Moreover, some commentators worry that the ABA’s output might tend
to be “lowest common denominator” because of the need to reach
205. See Green, supra note 29, at 127.
206. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A), (e)(2), (g), (h).
207. Supra note 88 and accompanying text.
208. See Green supra note 29, at 126–28; Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 97 (1991). Some commentators would apply,
or give considerable weight to, the conflict rules. See, e.g., Bassett, supra note 16, at 965
(“Nothing in Federal Rule 23 exempts counsel from the ethical rules, and the rules’ applicability
to all practicing attorneys does not take a holiday when an attorney chooses to represent a class
rather than an individual.”); Stuhan & Costello, supra note 14, at 1206 (“[I]t would be a mistake
to jettison ethical considerations in the class certification decision-making process altogether. The
rules, while not necessarily controlling, should inform the analysis.”).
209. See Peter G. McCabe, Renewal of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44 AM. U. L. REV.
1655, 1656–57 (1995).
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agreement from the ABA House of Delegates and other factors.210
Whether or not that is true, there is reason to fear that a new ABA rule
would not have as much effect as reform of federal law. As noted above,
many federal courts of appeals have expressly stated that they feel free to
depart from ordinary conflicts principles found in the ABA Model Rules
and state-enacted counterparts when necessary to successfully manage
class actions.211 Outside the class action context, federal courts exercise
supervisory authority (e.g., in ruling on disqualification motions) in
common law fashion to develop and apply their own legal standards
governing attorney conflicts.212 That is, federal courts sometimes deny
disqualification even when the lawyer has an impermissible conflict
under the rules because the court recognizes that there are interests at
stake for which the rules do not adequately account. Likewise, courts
sometimes disqualify lawyers on account of conflicts of interest even
when professional conduct rules would permit the representation.213 The
federal courts seem unlikely to relinquish this independent, case-by-case
approach even if the ABA wrote a new rule tailored to class action
conflicts.
However, it would be helpful for FRCP Rule 23 to be amended to
make explicit that conflicts of interest should receive the sustained
attention of courts overseeing class actions. There is no good reason why
FRCP Rule 23(g)(1)(A) should not expressly mention conflicts.
Unfortunately, it may be too much to expect that an amendment to the
FRCP will be generated to address the conflicts explored in this Article.
Observers of the last attempts by the Advisory Committee to amend
FRCP Rule 23 have noted that only relatively uncontroversial and
insignificant changes have been approved.214 The U.S. Supreme Court
seems to value its ability to effectively write and rewrite rules of civil
procedure via adjudication, and to be less interested in using the much
more cumbersome rulemaking process. Muddling through by lower
federal courts, with a slight possibility of clarification by the U.S.
Supreme Court, may be the best that can reasonably be hoped for.
210. WOLFRAM, supra note 18, § 2.6.1, at 48–49; see also id. at 49 (“Once a number of
lawyers defy a code rule (or are believed by other lawyers to have taken a negative stance), the
rule will be widely ignored because of competitive pressures and a sense of unfairness. In that
view of professional sociology, the area left for regulation is a relatively narrow range that falls
between marginally enforceable rules and insubstantial ones.” (footnote omitted)).
211. See supra notes 32–36 and accompanying text.
212. See Green, supra note 29, at 77–78, 120–22.
213. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 163 (1988).
214. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Class Actions and the
Counterrevolution Against Federal Litigation, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1514–16 (2017).
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What should this muddling look like? There are a range of relevant
considerations. First, there are considerations of fairness to the individual
clients who might be required to forgo their chosen lawyers, with whom
they have a sustained relationship. This is a situation for which the
individuals are not to blame, and that is essentially unavoidable and
intrinsic to class action procedure.215 Under the present law, the named
plaintiff remains an individual client at least until the class is certified,
which, in the case of pre-certification settlements, is virtually the end of
the case. It may seem unfair to require individual clients to give up their
lawyers at a midpoint or late point in the lawsuit. This sometimes occurs
in a joint representation when a conflict of interest unexpectedly emerges,
but clients in that situation have a choice whether to be jointly represented
and assume the risk that a conflict will later require the lawyer to
withdraw. And there would be a cost to addressing this problem by
appointing a different lawyer to serve as class counsel. It would not be in
the class’s best interest to be assigned a different lawyer who has no client
in the matter and therefore no prior familiarity or relationship with either
the matter or the class representatives.
Another consideration is whether disapproving of the joint
representation would avert the problems that it poses. Would class
counsel, who would now be a class representative’s former lawyer, favor
the class representative to a lesser extent, or would the lawyer’s
withdrawal from the individual representation be essentially
meaningless? Representing the class alone would solve some problems:
the lawyer would have no authority to negotiate a deal for the class
representative individually and no obligation as a matter of loyalty to
encourage the class representative to object to a settlement or to pursue
separate compensation. But the literature suggests that class counsel
sometimes favor the class representatives, with whom they have personal
dealings, over absent class members.216 In that event, formally
terminating the representation in the class action alone is unlikely to
diminish the lawyer’s loyalty to the class representative.
Yet another question is the frequency with which nascent conflicts
become manifest. That is an empirical question on which there appears
to be no research. But courts may make assumptions based on their own
experience, interactions, and study. If courts have not seen the problem
arise very often in their own and their colleagues’ courtrooms, it is easy
to be dismissive.

215. See supra Part III.
216. See supra Section II.C.
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Courts might also take account of the extent to which a conflict, if it
becomes manifest, is likely to be harmful. One’s assessment of harm
turns, in part, on one’s understanding of the class’s interests. If one thinks
that absent class members do not have a significant reliance interest at the
pre-certification stage, then one will not be too troubled by the prospect
that the class representative will sell out the nascent class with the
lawyer’s assistance by leveraging the class action to achieve a favorable
personal settlement. This assessment also depends on courts’ confidence
in their ability to prevent or avert harm to the class by overseeing the class
action. If judges believe that they can discern when a lawyer disserved
the class because of a conflict of interest, and believe they have the
resources to redress the problem, then there may be little reason to be
proactive or restrictive.
And, of course, courts will take account of the administrability and
burdensomeness of any alternative to doing nothing until a problem
screams out. Courts almost always place weight on the interest in judicial
economy.217 Almost any alternative will be more costly than the status
quo. Certainly, implementing the conflict rules at the pre-certification or
certification stage of a class action will impose a cost on the court, which,
as a proxy for the class, would presumably have to hold a hearing and
make a ruling on the permissibility of the joint representation. Ordinarily,
conflict rules are implemented by the lawyers alone, and therefore courts
may be unconcerned about whatever burdens they impose.
While this discussion identifies various unresolved questions, one can
understand why trial judges would be inclined to view class counsel’s
representation of class representatives as a FRCP Rule 23 problem to be
managed in a contextual, case-by-case manner, not an ABA Model Rule
1.7 question to be given a more categorical answer. The problem is
distinctive in various respects and generally implicates considerations of
both class action and judicial policies. The one-size-fits-all conflict rules
may not be best suited to this situation.
One can also understand why courts might tacitly adopt and apply a
FRCP Rule 23 standard that calls for ignoring the joint representation
until a party raises it as a problem. While courts do not appear to have
undertaken any explicit analysis, they may tacitly conclude that it would
be unfair to the individual clients to deprive them of their lawyers and
disadvantageous to the class to appoint a different lawyer; in most cases,
the joint representation will not result in manifest conflict that creates
217. Cf. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 (1982) (stating that “efficiency
and economy” are “a principal purpose of the [class action] procedure” (quoting Am. Pipe &
Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538, 553 (1974)).
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significant harm that could be averted by forbidding or terminating the
joint representation. And anyway, the problem is not worth the courts’
time. Further, the lawyers involved in class actions have little incentive
to disabuse courts of this assumption. In general, plaintiff-side lawyers
would not benefit from a stricter or more labor-intensive approach, since
many who vie to be selected as class counsel are likely to have an
individual client.
Given the legal framework established by FRCP Rule 23, trial courts
waiting to intervene until a problem arises may well be a reasonable
approach. It is not feasible for courts to require lawyers for the nascent
class to withdraw from representing individual class members, and at the
time of class certification, the risks to the class created by the joint
representation do not loom large enough to justify requiring class
representatives to relinquish the lawyers who represented them prior to
filing the class action lawsuit.
Less reasonable is courts’ failure to acknowledge the problem
described in this Article and to develop a jurisprudence that offers
guidance to plaintiffs’ lawyers in class actions about how to reconcile the
ethical and fiduciary duties they owe to a class or nascent class with those
they owe to an individual class member at various stages of a class action,
including in the context of the holdout, sellout, and payout scenarios
described in Part II. If the ABA Model Rules are inapplicable or subject
to implicit override by the policies of FRCP Rule 23, then lawyers need
guidance from elsewhere, and courts, which have a supervisory
responsibility over class actions and over the bar generally, are the
obvious place to look.
To begin, courts should resolve the question of what duties the lawyer
owes to the nascent class or to absent class members prior to class
certification and when they arise. Without knowing the scope of the
representation, the lawyer cannot know whether serving the interest of
the putative class representative at the expense of the nascent class
constitutes a fiduciary breach and a conflict of interest or if doing so is
entirely legitimate. Second, based on the resolution of that question,
courts should set forth their expectations when there is a significant risk
that the lawyer’s duties to the class, or nascent class, will be
compromised. Presumably, the ABA Model Rules address the risk to the
class representative and, in any event, that is not the court’s principal
concern under FRCP Rule 23. But courts are supposed to develop
standards and procedures to address when class counsel is compromising
or jeopardizing the class’s interests.218 Thus, courts should set forth
218. See supra notes 85–90 and accompanying text.
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whether and when lawyers should raise this problem with the trial court,
as they would other conflicts of interest, and, if not, how lawyers should
resolve the problem on their own.
Whether courts should seek assurances from plaintiffs’ lawyers at the
outset of a class action lawsuit that they have reached an appropriate
understanding with their individual clients is a harder question. In the
absence of an appropriate understanding, class counsel may be under
even greater pressure than otherwise to serve the individual client’s
interests at the expense of the class. If lawyers acknowledge and explain
to their individual clients the limits of their loyalty to the client and the
scenarios that may require the lawyer to withdraw, lawyers will find it
easier to comply with these expectations. If so, trial courts’ responsibility
to protect the class may call for some kind of inquiry.
This Article recommends that, in any class action except those led by
sophisticated entity plaintiffs, such as many securities class actions
governed by the PSLRA, district courts should inquire at the outset
whether class counsel is also representing any class members as
individuals and, if so, should require counsel to file with the court any
retainer agreements or other documents setting forth the scope and basis
of the attorney–client arrangement. If counsel had oral conversations with
individual clients about potential conflicts, the court should require that
these be reduced to writing. Any documents containing attorney–client
privileged information or opinion work product could be filed in camera
for judicial review only. District courts should also remind counsel of
their continuing obligation to bring potential or actual conflicts that
develop later to the courts’ attention.
Once courts set forth clear expectations, however, there may be no
need for oversight other than in the relatively infrequent cases in which
problems will be called to their attention. Moreover, it would be
burdensome on courts to question class representatives and their lawyers
to ensure that they have reached an understanding that will adequately
protect not only the individual client but the class or nascent class. The
point, therefore, is not that courts must go to lengths to police lawyers’
compliance with judicial expectations, it is simply that courts have been
remiss in failing to elaborate on their expectations in the first place.
CONCLUSION
For decades, courts and commentators have been well aware that
“[i]nherent in any class action is the potential for conflicting interests
among the class representatives, class counsel, and absent class
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members.”219 Notwithstanding this realization and a substantial amount
of scholarly and judicial commentary on class action conflicts, one kind
of conflict has not received due attention: the conflict that inevitably
arises when class counsel also represents individual class members as
individuals. This kind of conflict arises from the very beginning of a
putative class representation and predictably will put the lawyer for the
class and the individual in fraught positions with regard to the conflicting
interests of the class and the individual. The more radical possible
solutions—for instance, banning concurrent representation of a class and
an individual class member on an individual basis—call to mind the
medical adage about avoiding cures that are worse than the disease.
Therefore, more measured responses are warranted, primarily through (1)
greater disclosure of risks to individual clients by their attorneys; (2)
greater judicial oversight; and (3) an amendment to Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, or its advisory committee notes, calling on
courts to police the types of conflict this Article identifies.

219. Maywalt v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 67 F.3d 1072, 1077 (2d Cir. 1995); see
also Bash v. Firstmark Standard Life Ins. Co., 861 F.2d 159, 161 (7th Cir. 1988) (“[C]onflicts of
interest are built into the device of the class action.”).
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